OF BODY AND SPACE. 159 



is comprehended in space. Chronologically, in the language of Cousin, the idea of space sup- 

 poses or is preceded by that of body, while logically the idea of body comprehends, or essen- 

 tially involves the idea of space. The same contrast between the logical and chronological 

 order of dependence of correlative ideas is pointed out by Cousin in several other cases besides 

 that of body and space, the conception of the logical antecedent being accounted for in every 

 case by a separate principle of necessary judgment. 



The value of such an explanation must depend upon the knowledge we may have of this 

 supposed capacity in the understanding for the conception of relations and qualities logically 

 involved in the notion of things made known by experience, but forming no part of that which 

 experience itself reveals. If we have a clear conception or independent knowledge of such a 

 mode of intellectual developement the theory may be admitted (as far as it goes) as a sound 

 explanation of the several conceptions for which it professes to account ; but if the principle of 

 judgment to which the appeal is made in each of these cases, be known only by inference from the 

 single fact which forms the subject of inquiry, it is hard to see what useful end can be promoted 

 by the hypothesis. Now it cannot be pretended that we have any knowledge of the necessary 

 principle assumed in accounting for the notion of space, except in as far as it may be inferred 

 from finding that the first apprehension of body involves notions of Form and Extension, which 

 do not appear to be the proper object of any recognized faculty, and which therefore must 

 apparently be derived from some other principle than that of direct observation in actual 

 existence. It is certain, moreover, that the theory of Cousin leaves the matter open after all 

 to questions, a satisfactory answer to which would afford an effective solution of the problem 

 on purely empirical principles. 



The idea of space, it is said, arises spontaneously in the mind on the occasion of the first 

 apprehension of body. But the apprehension of a finite body is not a momentary act. The 

 knowledge of the form and size of the body apprehended is only acquired by degrees as we 

 pass our hand over the solid surface. At what precise moment then in this operation does the 

 body become clothed in the relations of space under the influence of the necessary judgment? 

 And what is the exact purport of the judgment supplied on this occasion by the constitution of 

 the understanding independent of experience? 



Does the infant, the moment he first presses his hand against a bodily obstacle, before he 

 has an opportunity of forming any judgment of its shape or magnitude, suddenly become 

 inspired with the conception of space reaching away from the object made known by touch to 

 an infinite distance in an infinite variety of directions ? Or is the idea of space superinduced 

 only after the infant has some experience of distance and direction as exemplified in bodily 

 surface ? In the latter alternative it is plainly supposed that the phenomena of distance and 

 direction exemplified in bodily surface may be the object of positive experience, and it will 

 accordingly be incumbent on the metaphysician to shew how that experience can be acquired 

 by the exercise of the faculties employed in the apprehension of body. But if we succeed in 

 tracing the notions of distance and direction to an empirical origin it may perhaps be found that 

 not much of the notion of space will remain to be accounted for by a mysterious necessity. 



On the other hand, if it be held, not only that the general notion of space is given by 

 necessary judgment, but also the knowledge of the specific dimensions ascertained in passing 



