Dr WHEWELL, ON PLATO'S NOTION OF DIALECTIC. 597 



But, we may ask, does a knowledge of sciences lead naturally to a knowledge of Ideas, as 

 absolute realities from which First Principles flow ? And supposing this to be true, as the 

 Platonic Philosophy supposes, is the Idea of the Good, as the source of moral truths, to be thus 

 attained to ? That it is, is the teaching of Plato, here and elsewhere ; but have the specula- 

 tions of subsequent philosophers in the same direction given any confirmation of this lofty 

 assumption ? 



In reply to this inquiry, I should venture to say, that this assumption appears to be a 

 remnant of the Socratic doctrine from which Plato began his speculations, that Virtue is a kind 

 of knowledge; and that all attempts to verify the assumption have failed. What Plato added 

 to the Socratic notion was, that the inquiry after The Good, the Supreme Good, was to be aided 

 by the analogy or suggestions of those sciences which deal with necessary and eternal truths ; 

 the supreme good being of the nature of those necessary and eternal truths. This notion is a 

 striking one, as a suggestion, but it has always failed, I think, in the attempts to work it out. 

 Those who in modern times, as Cudworth and Samuel Clarke, have supposed an analogy between 

 the necessary truths of Geometry and the truths of Morality, though they have used the 

 like expressions concerning the one and the other class of truths, have failed to convey clear 

 doctrines and steady convictions to their readers ; and have now, I believe, few or no followers. 



The result of our investigation appears to be, that thougli Plato added much to the 

 matter by means of which the mind was to be improved and disciplined in its research after 

 Principles and Definitions, he did not establish any form of Method according to which the 

 inquiry must be conducted, and by which it might be aided. The most definite notion of 

 Dialectic still remained the same with the original informal view which Socrates had taken 

 of it, as Xenophon tells us, (Mem. iv. 5, 11) when he says: "He said that Dialectic (to 

 oiaXeyecrOai) was so called because it is an inquiry pursued by persons who take counsel 

 together, separating the subjects considered according to their kinds (SiaKeyovTas). He held 

 accordingly that men should try to be well prepared for such a process, and should pursue it with 

 diligence: by this means, he thought, they would become good men, fitted for responsible offices 

 of command, and truly dialectical " (SiaXeKTucwTaTovs). And this is I conceive the answer to 

 Mr Grote's interrogatory exclamation (Vol. vm. p. 577) : " Surely the Etymology here given 

 by Xenophon or Socrates of the word (SidkeyeaOai) cannot be considered as satisfactory." The 

 two notions, of investigatory Dialogue, and Distribution of notions according to their kinds, 

 which are thus asserted to be connected in etymology, were, among the followers of Socrates, 

 connected in fact; the dialectic dialogue was supposed to involve of course the dialectic 

 division of the subject. 



Trinity Lodge, April 4, 1855. 



