ACCORDING TO PLATO. 601 



Principles to reason from. Conceptions suppose some basis in the mind which gives them their 

 evidence. What then is the first term in each of these two Series ? 



The Principles of Demonstration must be seen by Intuition. 



Conceptions derive their properties from certain powers or attributes of the mind which we 

 may term Ideas. 



Therefore the two series are 



Intuition : Demonstration : Belief : Conjecture. 

 Ideas : Conceptions : Things : Images. 

 Plato further teaches that the two former terms in each Series belong to the Intelligible, the two 

 latter to the Visible World : and he supposes that the ratio of these two primary segments of 

 the line is the same as the ratio in which each segment is divided *. 



In using the term Ideas to describe the mental sources from which Conceptions derive their 

 validity in demonstration, I am employing a phraseology which I have already introduced in the 

 Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. But independently altogether of this, I do not see what 

 other term could be employed to denote the mental objects, attributes, or powers, whatever they 

 be, from which Conceptions derive their evidence, as Demonstrative Truths derive their evidence 

 from Intuitive Truths. 



That the Scheme just presented is Plato's doctrine on this subject, I do not conceive there 

 can be any doubt. There is a little want of precision in his phraseology, arising from his mixing 

 together the two series. In fact, his final series 



Noesis : Dianoia : Pistis : Eikasia ; 

 is made by putting in the second place, instead of Demonstration, which is the process pursued, 

 or Science, which is the knowledge obtained, Conception, which is the object with which the 

 mind deals. Such deviations from exact symmetry and correlation in speaking of the faculties 

 of the mind, are almost unavoidable in every language. And there is yet another source of such 

 inaccuracies of language ; for we have to speak, not only of the process of acquiring knowledge, 

 and of the objects with which the mind deals, but of the Faculties of the mind which are thus 

 employed. Thus Intuition is the Process ; Ideas are the Object, in the first term of our series. 

 The Faculty also we may call Intuition ; but the Greek offers a distinction. Noesis is the Pro- 

 cess of Intuition ; but the Faculty is Nous. If we wish to preserve this distinction in English, 

 what must we call the Faculty ? I conceive we must call it the Intuitive Reason, a term well 

 known to our older philosophical writers |. Again : taking the second term of the series, Demon- 

 stration is the process, Science, the result ; and Conceptions are the objects with which the mind 

 deals. But what is the Faculty thus employed ? What is the Faculty employed in Demon- 

 stration ? The same philosophical writers of whom I spoke would have answered at once, the 

 Discursive Reason ; and I do not know that, even now, we can suggest any better term. The 

 Faculty employed in acquiring the two lower kinds of knowledge, the Faculty which deals with 

 Things and their Images is, of course, Sense or Sensation. 



* The four segments might be as 4 : 2 : 2 : 1 ; or as I t Hence the mind Reason receives 



9 : 6 : 6 : 4 ; or generally, us a : a r : ar : ar 3 . Intuitive or Discursive. 



Milton. 



77—2 



