470 Count de Stgur. 



tiality for Russia has led him into error. In the opening chapter of 

 the work, he asserts * that the Emperor by the peace of Tilsit in 

 1807 compromised the honour and interest of Russia.' Now, if 

 Napoleon erred in forming the articles of this treaty, it was in being 

 too generous to Russia who had previously made no scruple of rob- 

 bing her Austrian and Prussian allies in order to enlarge her own 

 territory, and which in 1809, when she was in alliance with France 

 had acted the dishonourable part of promising 100,000 men for the 

 war against Austria and of sending only 30,000, who arrived loo late 

 to be of any service. Russia, indeed, needed not the conservative 

 care of Napoleon, for no nation of Europe so well knew how to watch 

 over its own interests, even to a degree that justice could not sanc- 

 tion. Enslaved Poland is a living proof of the delicate regard that 

 the Czar pays to his interests and his honour. 



But ]in the following chapter, the author says further : * France 

 alienated the feelings of the masses by its conquests and of sovereigns 

 by its revolution and change of dynasty.' As for the feelings of the 

 masses, the people generally, except in England, had a very small 

 voice in determining the balance of international power: and cer- 

 tainly the few gleams of liberal sentiment that flashed for a moment 

 on the Continent are entirely attributable to the hints given by the 

 Code Napoleon. As for the feelings of the European sovereigns, 

 they might have been unfavourable to the revolution ; but it would 

 have been an act of the greatest folly to repudiate the only man who 

 could check the republican movement which made them totter on 

 their thrones. In fact, those who attribute the gigantic wars of this 

 period to a love of the Bourbons and to a personal hatred of Napo- 

 leon are entirely in error. The two real causes were as follows : 

 England asserted her entire sovereignty over the seas, and France,, 

 against which all the ports of Europe were closed, strove to get some 

 compensation by territorial acquisitions for the losses that it had sus- 

 tained from the naval ambition of England. The advocates of the 

 war between England and France were fond of justifying their own 

 aggressions and of denying the right of the French to the possession 

 of continental power at all : but in the present day, when the 

 interests of the two countries are firmly united and international 

 policy is based on sound principles, such rabid nnti-Gallicisms are 

 only heard from the dotards of the olden time, who have lived long 

 beyond their day, but have not the moral power to disabuse them- 

 selves of their ancient prejudices. 



With respect to what M. de Segur says, that the French were the 

 aggressors in the war with Russia, we shall content ourselves with 

 quoting the authority of M. Bouterlin, (aide-de camp of the Emperor 

 Alexander), who states most distinctly that for two years previously 

 secret but active preparations had been going on for this war. The 

 embarrassment of Napoleon in Spain was seized on as a fit opportu- 

 nity for overthrowing his power ; and the military movements of 

 Russia began in 1810. 



Omitting all mention of the many blunders which the author makes 

 ^speaking of Austria, and of his still grosser mistakes respecting 



