16-27.] Letter on Affairs in general. 67 



And the defendant, too, in a case of LIBEL here lies the monstrous 

 incongruity is treated by the Court in a manner entirely the reverse of 

 that which it treats a man upon his trial for every other crime. In every 

 offence but LIBEL, five-sixths of the crime is taken to lie as it must 

 lie not in the simple act done but in the spirit, or circumstances, under 

 which that act was committed. A man on his trial for Murder has the 

 act of having done that which caused death proved against him. But 

 this is not " murder ;" and he proceeds at once to explain away the act 

 to change its apparent signification. He shews that the blow which 

 killed was accidental that death was not intended that there was a 

 fair fight that what he did was in self-defence ; and the act of * kill- 

 ing," which, done maliciously, might have been "murder" as the ma- 

 licious publication of an offensive fact may be LIBEL is reduced to 

 " manslaughter," or he is entirely acquitted. 



So, in a case of robbery. The prisoner took the goods : this is the act 

 like the act (in libel) of publication. But he shews that the goods were 

 his own, and had been got from him by fraud that he was on such 

 terms with the prosecutor as gave him some constructive right in the 

 property ; and the value of the offence is changed, So, in forgery : the 

 writing of a man's name is proved but the prisoner shews that he had 

 an authority to write it. But, in LIBEL, the mere dry, single act 

 the " publication " being shewn no explanation can be heard from the 

 defendant no defence no account of the really important point, the 

 MOTIVE. But we proceed to conviction. 



Now, why not let an indictment for LIBEL go to the jury like any 

 other indictment ? Why not let the truth of the statement complained 

 of be sheivn not as, of itself, a necessary justification, however fully it 

 may be made out but as shewing the defendant's intent being his 

 defence ; and leaving the jury to consider as they do of every other 

 defence whether it amounts to a justification or not ? This is not pro- 

 posing to make the truth of any statement of necessity its defence ; 

 because we know that there are abundant cases in which the " truth " is 

 no honest or fair subject of publication ;* as, for instance, in the case 

 now pending of Madame Vestris, the actress ; who, whatever her private 

 habits may be, has never obtruded those habits upon the public ; and 

 whom no one will suppose a common pennyless blackguard ought to be 

 allowed to make money of. by putting forth a mass of scandalous filth, 

 under the title of her " Memoirs." But still, though you will not let the 

 " truth " amount to a claim (under indictment for LIBEL) for necessary 

 acquittal, why not let it form (where it can be shewn) that which it is a 

 matter for consideration ? 



The real legislative answer to this and it is an answer which I am 

 not quite prepared to deny is the possible inconvenience in a case of 

 political libel. The press is an engine of terrific power ; and if you give 

 to juries the power of choosing, it is possible that some jury may, at 

 some time or other, acquit a man whom it is material for the public 

 peace to have found guilty. But then if we grant this tremendous 

 licence to courts of law giving up, in fact, as regards LIBEL, the 



any man who wrote to his friend in the country that he had seen, Mr. So-and-So, their 

 mutual neighbour, tried and convicted of forgery, might as certainly (though the fact 

 were true) be indicted for a libel, and must as certainly he. found guilty-r-as Mr. Ilu-at 

 has been found guilty of a libel upon M. Bochsa. 



K 2 



