166 The Re-assembling of Parliament. [FEB. 



grant that a power go tremendous as that of the press of England may be 

 used against individuals, not for the purpose of annoyance merely, but for 

 absolute annihilation; and that, let a man be ever so fortified with the 

 attributes of wealth, rank, talents, or even virtues, the press, malignantly 

 used, can expel him from society. Hence, we admit that the public 

 that is, the law which is made for the protection of the public should 

 have some means of taking care that the administration of a thing so potent 

 should be honest and judicious, Like the more vigorous medicines the 

 treasures of the healing art those energies which render the press the 

 balsam of life in the hands of the upright and the skilful, turn it into the 

 poison of death when it is ignorantly or maliciously given ; and, therefore, 

 there ought to be some security that it shall never be applied with a bad 

 intention. As the law stands, however or rather as the total want of all 

 law stands the good and the evil of the press are subjected to the same 

 restriction ; and the man who administers it in the most skilful manner, 

 and with the most beneficial intention, for restoring or furthering the public 

 health of the country, is liable to the very same punishment as the wretch 

 who, for the gratification of private malice or revenge, uses it for felonious 

 and murderous purposes. Any thing that is written respecting any man 

 may be construed into a libel; and, in extreme cases, the only facts that 

 have to be proved are the fact of publishing, and the identity of the person 

 who makes the complaint. If, indeed, the complainant seeks damages 

 in a civil action at common law, the party may plead the truth ; but even 

 there the truth does not go to the jury as matter of evidence. If, again, 

 the proceeding be by criminal information, the party complained of may 

 expatiate upon the justice of what he has published; but here, again, the 

 truth and propriety of the matter complained of are not received as evi- 

 dence. In obtaining a rule, indeed, there may be cause shewn against 

 the rule ; and if that cause shall happen to satisfy the reason^ or fall in with 

 the feelings of the /judge before whom it is shewn, he may dismiss the 

 application; but this places the whole matter, which ought in strict jus- 

 tice to be with the jury, in the power of the judge as an individual ; and 

 as the time has not yet arrived when public men can look upon the press 

 in a perfectly fair and disinterested manner, the discretionary power of 

 the judge does not tend in any way to the safety of an honest man, who 

 stands forward, and, for the general good of the public, calls a villain a 

 villain. These cases these two several modes of applying the same rule 

 and the same punishment to the innocent and to the guilty are bad 

 enough : but worse remains behind. The party who feels or fancies that 

 he is libelled, may proceed by indictment at the sessions ; and the grand 

 jury, who, from the general construction of mankind, cannot be presumed 

 to be intuitively gifted with a clear discernment of the intentions with 

 which the publication is made ; and as they receive no evidence that can 

 throw the smallest light upon this the only important point of the case 

 they must confine themselves to the simple finding that John Doe is the 

 publisher, and Richard Roe the party meant: and, if they find thus far, 

 the case must go to the sessions, where the party accused is denied even 

 the benefit of counsel, in any other way than for cross-examining the pro- 

 secutor's witnesses ; and, as these witnesses have nothing to prove, the 

 defendant is left open to the certainty of a verdict procured by all the inge- 

 nuity, all the quibbling, and all the sophistication which the prosecutor 

 can hire against him. In consequence of this, the law of libel is one of 

 those breaches in the security of individuals, through which the brigands of 



