630 Naval Administration of Great Britain. 



In alluding to those impotent vessels, brigs of ten guns, our experi- 

 enced author says, 



" With respect to the ten-gun brigs, of .which we appear to be so fond, and on 

 which, during the last ten years, such large sums must have been laid out, I can 

 only say that in my judgment they are entirely unfit for every purpose of war, 

 as they sail indifferently, and are in point of force inferior to most privateers. I 

 would therefore almost pledge my existence not one of them is seen on the sea 

 in six months after the commencement of hostilities. How those who have 

 lavished the public money on this most useless class of vessels will then be able 

 to justify themselves, I do not presume to conjecture. 



"I see, by referring to the list of the navy, that we have now above forty of 

 these brigs afloat or building, all except one or two laid down since the peace, 

 besides twenty-eight more employed as packets; for which service experience 

 has now fully proved them to be less calculated, and from their construction 

 more unsafe than any other description of vessel which could possibly have been 

 selected." 



We perfectly acquiesce in these remarks. A gallant marquis, not 

 more distinguished for his equestrian than his aquatic accomplishments, 

 has been heard to assert that, " if he ever accepted the office of First Lord 

 of the Admiralty, his primary measure would be to break up these worse 

 than useless vessels, and sell their remains for fire- wood." As regards 

 the multiplication of small vessels, the Americans are wiser than we, as 

 our author exemplifies. 



" With respect to the American navy, says Admiral Pen rose, the comparative 

 size of their ships of the line, frigates, and corvettes, is now so universally known, 

 that I shall content myself with two short extracts from a work just published 

 by a very intelligent naval officer on this subject, (Travels in North America, by 

 Captain Basil Hall, R.N.) in 1827, 1828. 



" ' At the navy-yard .(at Gosport) there was a line-of-battle ship, the New 

 York, (called a seventy-four) of ninety guns, and the St. Lawrence, (called forty- 

 four) of sixty guns : the frigate is round-sterned, and they are both built ex- 

 clusively of live oak, in a compact and apparently skilful manner. 



" ' It occurred to me, when looking at these large ships, that there was no good 

 policy in building such an expensive class of vessels ; for other nations would of 

 course profit by past experience, and avoid unequal matches in future. 

 " ' That is very true,' said an American naval officer, who was present when I 

 made this observation ; ' but we calculate in this way : in the event of a war with 

 you or France, for instance, it may happen that our enemy will have many times 

 our number of ships such as these, but he will have a still greater proportion of 

 smaller ships. If one of our frigates should chance to meet with one of yours of 

 the same class, she must of course take her chance, and we trust she will play 

 her part as becomes her; but as the greater number of your ships are smaller 

 ones of the old sort, the chances are more in favour of our meeting them ; and 

 if we do, the balance will tell on our side: thus, in either way, we hope to pre- 

 serve the advantage we have already gained.' "Vol. iii. p. 83. 



The conversation between Captain Hall and the American officer speaks 

 volumes. But the disparity of size in hostile vessels under the same 

 denomination did not originate with the Americans. In the commence- 

 ment of the revolutionary war, the French built larger and heavier 

 frigates than we did even at its close. La Forte mounted twenty-four 

 pounders on the main deck ; La Pomone and La Prudente were of equal 

 dimensions ; and L'Egyptienne was built on the scantling of a line-of- 

 battle ship. These examples, however, were lost at home. 



But if the reader is struck with astonishment at these multiplied in- 

 stances of inefficiency in the direction of our naval affairs, his wonder will 



