1830.] Naval Administration of Great Britain. 631 



be increased when he learns that the practice of our gunnery afloat is 

 equally neglected. 



"Another most important point/' says the Admiral, "to which too little at- 

 tention has heen paid since the peace of 1815, is our artillery practice. There 

 can be no doubt that our reverses during the American war are to be attributed, 

 not only to the great superiority of the ships we engaged, but to the imperfect 

 manner in which our officers and men had been trained to the use of their guns. 

 It will, perhaps, hardly be credited hereafter, that there was at that time no re- 

 gular system of exercise established by authority in the British navy, but that 

 each ship had its own particular plan and method, varying of course according 

 to the experience and degree of information possessed by the captain, as well as 

 to the degree of importance which he attached to the subject. I need not detail 

 the fatal negligence which too often prevailed, and which became only known in 

 its full extent by its unfortunate results. At the conclusion of the peace, how- 

 ever, the officers of the navy were unanimous and urgent for the immediate 

 adoption of a better system, and various suggestions were offered to the Admi- 

 ralty as to the best method of proceeding. Assuming, as appeared most probable, 

 that our ships would be almost entirely in port, some recommended an exercising 

 ground at each naval arsenal, in which the crews of the guard-ships, &c., might 

 be regularly trained ; others preferred a ship fitted for this purpose ; but all con- 

 curred in the necessity of establishing some uniform practice. In 1817 Sir H. 

 Douglas, an officer who combines an hereditary interest in the welfare of that 

 service which owes so much to his father with all that science and experience 

 in war can afford, laid before the Board of Admiralty a most valuable work, con- 

 taining a series of suggestions on this subject, which, if they had been properly 

 attended to and acted upon, must have placed our system of artillery exercise on 

 a very different footing from that on which it at present stands. It does not 

 however appear that between 1817, when he first offered his manuscript work to 

 the Board of Admiralty, and 1819, when he requested their permission to publish 

 it, any attention was paid to the valuable suggestions with which it abounds, be- 

 yond issuing by authority a sort of uniform manual exercise for the great guns ; 

 and, until 1827, when His Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence became Lord 

 High Admiral of England, I was not able to observe that any effectual steps 

 were taken to introduce or enforce such a regular system of artillery practice, 

 especially amongst our ships on the home stations, as might enable us to keep 

 pace with the improvements rapidly introducing amongst our maritime rivals. 



" During his royal highness's short administration, much was undoubtedly 

 accomplished by his own frequent personal inspections of the ships in commis- 

 sion, arid the attention he paid to every thing which respected their artillery ; 

 but he was unfortunately too short a time in office to establish any material or 

 permanent improvements in this part of our system ; and I cannot therefore do 

 better than give my readers in this place, and as nearly as possible in Sir H. 

 Douglas's own words, a sketch of the plan which he, twelve years ago, suggested 

 to the Admiralty which at the moment appears to have been received with en- 

 tire approbation but which since that time has not (as far as I can learn) been 

 thought worthy of further consideration. 



" When the navies of Europe, opposed to us in the late war, had been swept 

 from the face of the ocean by the gallant achievements of the British marine, a 

 period of triumphant, undisputed dominion ensued, during which our seamen 

 were not in general sufficiently practised in the exercise of those weapons by 

 which that dominion had been gained ; but, in the pride and ease of conquest, 

 were suffered, in many instances, to lose much of that proficiency in warlike 

 practice which had been acquired in a long series of arduous service. No one 

 seemed to doubt that the decided superiority which we had displayed in every 

 action with a marine generally esteemed expert in gunnery was owing to a de- 

 gree of permanent perfection in our own system, which, animated by the well- 

 known gallantry of our officers and seamen, would always ensure us victory over 

 the vessels of any other state, even in conflicts with superior force. Relying with 

 too great confidence on this persuasion, we were led to despise expected foes 



