632 Naval Administration of Great Britain. JuNE, 



whom we only rated on a level with those we had uniformly beaten, and to en- 

 gage rashly in very unequal contests with the ships of a power whose practice we 

 have since found is not of that character which should render us satisfied with 

 the condition, or indifferent about the improvement, of our own." 



In pursuance of this subject, we may ourselves state that the want of 

 proper exercise at the guns is not to be charged against the commanding 

 officers of ships, but is attributable to the scanty allowance of ammuni- 

 tion by the Board of Ordnance; so that, if a captain feel it imperatively 

 necessary to exercise his men at a mark, he must account for the con- 

 sumption of powder by a false entry in the expense-books. For example, 

 he will direct the gunner to state officially that fifty or a hundred shots 

 have been expended in bringing vessels to, and so many barrels of powder 

 consumed in salutes and signals, when perhaps for these purposes not 

 a grain of powder had been actually consumed. Thus a zealous officer is 

 reduced to the following annoying dilemma; namely, that he must either 

 neglect a part of discipline, the want of which might be fatal to the ship 

 confided by his country to his care, or else he must tell a lie, and run the 

 risk of losing his commission, by false expenditure of his majesty's stores. 

 If one half the powder wasted in absurd salutes, and in more foolish com- 

 memorations, such as the observance of the anniversary of Gunpowder 

 Plot, (which has no other effect than to produce laughter in little boys, 

 and to cause annoyance to the sick and ailing of his majesty's subjects) 

 were devoted to practice in naval artillery, the service in general would 

 be essentially benefited, and actions at sea more speedily decided. 



We might say more on this subject, had we either time or space ; how- 

 ever, what has been developed, we trust, will call general attention to the 

 Admiral's pamphlet. Sir Charles Penrose has indeed done a great service 

 to his country ; for we hold it to be utterly impossible that his remarks 

 should fail to work some reform, if not a complete one, in the system of 

 Naval administration. His complaints and suggestions are the result of 

 a long life ; and the ability with which he has condensed his whole ex- 

 perience into a few pithy pages cannot be too highly estimated. He not 

 only points out the disease, but prescribes the remedy, as the following 

 passage will show : 



t( If I am asked what practical suggestions I have to offer, and by what mean 

 I would propose to remedy the defects I complain of, (without incurring an ex- 

 pense which the national finances cannot at this moment conveniently bear), 

 I reply that I can only recommend our discontinuing, without loss of time, all 

 further expenditure on any of those classes of ships which I consider so useless 

 and objectionable; to suspend in a great degree the construction of ships of the 

 line, (except perhaps one of the new class now in progress of ninety guns on two 

 decks, for the purpose of ascertaining their qualities by actual experiment before 

 any larger number are laid down,) and to turn our thoughts chiefly towards 

 those classes of ships to which I have principally alluded in the course of these 

 observations. I should recommend our satisfying ourselves, by full and careful 

 trial, whether the first and second classes of frigates, such as the Barham and 

 Southampton, are in all respects equal to the expectations entertained of them, 

 especially whether the razeed seventy-fours answer so well as to justify the ex- 

 pense incurred in altering them. From these experiments certain rules may be 

 laid down for their stowage, trim, armament, &c. &c. and prevent that general 

 uncertainty on these points, which must inevitably prevail, if they were hastily 

 fitted out by officers unacquainted with their peculiarities, who could only try 

 experiments which might or might not succeed, and would, in the latter case, 



occasion much disappointment and delay." But we shall return to this very 



interesting subject in our next. 



