444? Mr. H. Sloggett on the Constitution of Matter. 



ferable to its rival in perhaps all other respects, has hitherto 

 been incapable of being generally received, on account of its 

 giving unsatisfactory results when submitted to mathematical 

 analysis. In endeavouring to obviate this difficulty, I con- 

 ceived the object completely attained, by a supposition some- 

 what analogous to Mr. Laming's, though essentially different 

 in respect to the assumption of solid atoms. As we know 

 matter only by its properties, it certainly seems more rational 

 to call those properties themselves matter, than to invent an 

 imaginary substance with inseparably attached attributes. 



In Mr. Laming's theory I can see no vindication of the 

 theory of solid atoms, because it is not necessary for them to 

 be admitted. He might consider the term " atom " to signify 

 nothing more than "centre of attraction." With this quali- 

 fication I agree with him, that different atoms are naturally 

 associated with different quantities of electricity ; arising, how- 

 ever, from different degrees of power in the atoms, or centres 

 of attraction. An objection apparently arises, in limine, to his 

 supposition of incomplete external strata. How are they to 

 remain incomplete when placed in circumstances adapted to 

 supply them with as much electricity as would be necessary 

 to complete them ? Or in other words, why should they not 

 retain the electricity which they have once received ? I have 

 mentioned this objection because it appears to be an essential 

 point in Mr. Laming's paper, and because it is in fact the only 

 one, except that before mentioned, so far as it goes, in which 

 his hypothesis differs materially from my own. It will be 

 proper to premise, that by the word atom, I mean nothing more 

 than a centre or combination of centres of attractive or re- 

 pulsive force; those combinations of centres, when they occur, 

 occupying the same point; implicating, in opposition to the 

 usual notion, that matter may be penetrable. It is necessary 

 that this be remembered", because the word in its common 

 sense involves circumstances incompatible with another mean- 



Philosophers have long considered it established that the 

 atoms of bodies attract each other ; and it cannot but be ad- 

 mitted that a repulsive principle between them is just as clearly 

 evidenced. Hence we have just grounds for the assumption 

 that the atoms of bodies are both attractive and repulsive of 

 each other. But this is an inconsistency if an atom be but a 

 single principle, and as there is abundant proof of the existence 

 of an agent distinct from matter in bodies, there are ample 

 reasons for attributing the attracting property to this agent 

 (electricity), and the repulsive power to the matter itself. But 

 it remains to be shown how these are to be united in order to 



