274 PLYMOUTH INSTITUTION. 



October 30th. — Rev. R. Luney's Lecture on Jleasoning 

 considered as a Science compared with Logic as an Art. 



The lecturer introduced the subject by some observations on 

 the importance of accuracy and precision in the use of words, in 

 all philosophical enquiries; and in support of his views on this 

 part of the subject, appealed to the authority of Locke, who, in 

 his celebrated treatise on the human understanding, has devoted 

 a very large portion of the work, to the consideration of the abuse 

 and right application of words. Several instances of confusion, 

 and apparent contrariety of statement, where little, if any difference 

 of opinion in reality, existed, were adduced by the lecturer, from 

 the writings of Dr. Johnson, Locke, Reid, Stewart, Brown, &c. ; 

 and these apparent differences were shewn to have originated in 

 the various and even opposite senses in which the words in ques- 

 tion had been employed by these authors. The familiar words 

 Reason, Reasoning, Judgment, and Understanding, were shewn 

 to have been used by the best writers on metaphysical science, in 

 very different, and in some instances, in totally opposite senses. 

 In support of this statement, the lecturer quoted several conflict- 

 ing definitions of these words from numerous standard authors 

 on intellectual and moral science. The Rev. gentleman then 

 proceeded to define the sense in which he proposed to employ 

 the several words in question in the subsequent portion of his 

 lecture. He here pointed out the distinction between the exercise 

 of reason and an act of reasoning, and observed that the latter 

 constituted only one of the various functions or operations of the. 

 former; — a distinction, which, as the lecturer observed, accounts 

 for the apparent paradox, so frequently met with, of persons 

 being accurate and powerful reasoners, and yet very unreasonable 

 men. 



After distinguishing between an act of judgment and an act of 

 Reasoning, the lecturer enumerated a variety of causes, which 

 tended, in their operation, to bias and pervert the decisions of the 

 former; and gave a variety of amusing illustrations of the oppo- 

 site decisions at which different persons arrive when judging of 

 the same objects or of the same relations. 



After adverting to the nature of proof, and the folly of attempt- 

 ing to prove or explain ^ first principle, the lecturer enumerated 

 and examined the various elementary truths, or intuitive principles 

 of belief ; and shewed that they neither require nor admit of expla- 

 nation nor proof; tliat they are inherent in the constitution of our 

 intellectual and moral nature; that all men necessarily believe 



