290 D:s Reply to C/s Observations [April, 



Article V. 



Reply to Cs Observations on Mr. Herapath's Theory, 



(To the Editor of the A:i,itil6 of Philosophy.) 

 SIR, 

 If you think the following answer to C.'s observations on Mr, 

 Herapath's theory worthy of a place in the Annals of Philosophy y 

 it is at your disposal. I am Sir, 



Your obedient servant, D. 



" He who has published a theory on any point in philosophy/' 

 your correspondent C. gives us to understand in his attack on 

 Mr. Herapath, " has no right to complain " of any observations 

 tending to expose its fallacy; and from the mode of his own attack 

 we may, I suppose, add, in whatever manner they may be made. 

 Without inquiring into the soundness or propriety of this new doc- 

 trine, we may with justice affirm, that when a man sets himself up 

 as a judge in scientific matters without being fully competent, and 

 acrimoniously attacks the theory of another without well under- 

 standing it, or the subject, " his exposure is all he ought to 

 expect." Should it appear, as I think it will, that C. has done 

 both of these things, '^ he will, therefore, have no right to com- 

 plain of the following observations " in reply to his. 



C. sets out with an observation well calculated to give us a 

 high opinion of his inductive accuracy. Mr. H. had said, '* It 

 is impossible by correct reasoning from false principles to bring 

 out true conclusions." The axiomatic evidence of this position 

 no one, I think, can dispute, if what is evidently iraphed be con- 

 sidered ; namely, that the reasoning as well as correct must be 

 complete by including all the circumstances which bear on the 

 case. But C, says, " In innumerable instances true conclusions 

 may be brought out by correct reasoning from false principles. 

 If, for instance, the errors on each side should exactly compen- 

 sate each other, the result will be correct, though the foundation 

 be erroneous." So then correct reasoning must contain errors ; 

 that is, 1 apprehend, truth must be error. Of course, by parity 

 of argument,ya/5e reasoning must contain ?io errors, or erjor must 

 be truth, and wrong, right. Is it not a happy thing Newton did 

 not know, or did not believe this ? How is it after so " conclu- 

 sive an argument," C. thought it necessary to continue his 

 *' observations ? " Would not this " beautiful reasoning ! and 

 invincible demonstration ! " at once crush the whole of Mr. H.'s 

 theory ? What does it matter about their having no connexion 

 with the subject ? C.^s reasoning has " the distinguished excel- 



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