304 



NOTES AND QUERIES. 



[2nd s. No 94, Oct. 17, '67. 



stone of all moral rules, they may still differ upon 

 the effect of the disputed rule ; but here, if they 

 can get no farther they must stop — a humiliating 

 conclusion, it is true, but there is no help for it. 

 Generally, however, in such a case there will be 

 some other thing agreed on between the parties to 

 be taken as good evidence of the concord between 

 the particular instance and the standard. As, for 

 example, our Common Law is said to consist of 

 certain rules of action which from time immemo- 

 rial have been observed or enforced in England. 

 But as neither this, nor the sub-definitions with 

 which the lawyers hedge it, are practically ap- 

 plicable, they have agreed upon certain evidences 

 of the existence of these customs — as declaratory 

 statutes, ancient though originally unauthorised 

 writers, and decisions of the Courts. A lawyer 

 might, no doubt, like the gentleman I have quoted, 

 express his surprise that Brother B.'s perceptions 

 of ancient customs should be " so obtuse," and his 

 regret that so sound a lawyer should be induced 

 to defend, &c., but he does not. He merely ap- 

 peals to the recognised authorities. It is evident, 

 however, that none of these can prove the existence 

 of a custom, and that the legal doctrine that they 

 do is merely a convenient fiction : farther, as no 

 one can plead that a custom may, or may not, 

 exist in spite of all these, it is also evident that 

 the doctrine of customs being law is itself a fiction, 

 and that in fact these evidences are themselves 

 the law. 



Let us apply this example to the question 

 of " corrupt English." What is iwcorrupt Eng- 

 lish ? Clearly not a something which is most 

 uniform, most euphonous, or abstractedly the best 

 possible vehicle for an Englishman's ideas. It is 

 assuredly not after a reference to any of these 

 standards that my countrymen talk of what they 

 shall do " xmder the circumstances," instead of 

 " dans les circonstances," as a Frenchman says, and 

 continue to write "business" with a m, and "wo- 

 men " with an o. It is evidently simply for the 

 reason — very inconclusive in some eyes — that other 

 persons do so. There is scarcely an instance of 

 cacophony, inconsistency, &c., which may not find 

 S parallel which is admitted to be " incorrupt 

 English" on no other ground than this. Who 

 then are these persons whose mere habit gives the 

 sanction ? Some one will say " all polite or edu- 

 cated persons." If I were inclined to be captious, 

 I might ask " where ? In Edinburgh, Dublin, or 

 London ? " The reader will say no doubt " in 

 London;" and as an Englishman I would not 

 dispute this ; although everyone knows that the 

 city of Tours claims to be the " sole depositary " 

 of the standard of pure French; and a native of 

 Marseilles will entreat a visitor from Paris or 

 Tours to " parler Chretien ; " while the lingua Ito- 

 mana is only held to be good in hocca l\isca7ia, and 

 even " Cockney pronunciation " is a term of re- 



proach, &c. Admitting, however, that " incorrupt 

 English " is the language of polite and educated 

 persons, what means can I have of knowing polite 

 and educated persons, save their habitual use of 

 "incorrupt English?" unless the aristocratic drawl 

 and lisp — the final " aw " and the conversion of 

 rs into ws — at which Punch makes us laugh, be 

 accepted as a token. But supposing we attempt to 

 come to an agreement as to what particular persons 

 shall be included in that class. Shall Lord John 

 Russell, who is constantly " ohleeged" be admitted, 

 or the late Mr, Hume, who always spoke of the 

 " tottle " of a sum ; or the late Mr. Rogers, who 

 used to talk of " Lunnun ? " in which city, al- 

 though some of your readers may not have heard 

 of it, he believed himself to have resi(ied for some 

 years, and therefore would, it is presumed, know 

 its name. No doubt as Baconian philosophers we 

 ought to "make out a large list" of polite and 

 educated people, with notes of their habits in this 

 respect, and the majority in case of difference 

 should decide every question ; or, where the ba- 

 lance is equal, both sides should be declared right. 

 But a gentleman proposing this is like a lawyer 

 who talks of " customs." His standard is prac- 

 tically inapplicable. We must therefore, I fear, 

 if we discuss such subjects at all, proceed by the 

 slow, humble, and laborious method of first agree- 

 ing, if we can, upon some list of authors or lexi- 

 cographers, whose practice or dicta as to ortho- 

 graphy, etymology, syntax, prosody, or idioms, 

 shall be accepted as good evidence of the law ; 

 the decision, in case of difference, lying with the 

 majority. This conclusion is no doubt unsatis- 

 factory, and it is undoubtedly to be lamented that 

 fate has given us no better means of settling such 

 disputes. Having ascertained this fact, however, 

 we should I hope at least be relieved from those 

 arguments upon uniformity, original derivative 

 meaning, analogy with other languages, and some 

 assumed inherent fitness of things, with which 

 such discussions are always overlaid. Disputants 

 may, no doubt, after all, reject the authorities, de- 

 clare their personal opinion of the custom of the 

 polite and learned, and put themselves, as the 

 lawyers say, " upon the country." I simply wish 

 to suggest that In such case — the " yea " or 

 " nay " once uttered — no possible benefit can 

 result from continuing the war, — a conclusion ob- 

 vious enough ; although one that is evidently not 

 well understood. W. Mot Thomas, 



ISAAC BARROW. 



Since I sent my former Note on Barrow, I have 

 met with a notice of him in Baker's MSS., which 

 is not referred to in the printed Index. It was 

 known before, from Dr, AValter Pope, that Bar- 

 row's " malignancy " as an undergraduate was 



