170 Major-General Sir Howard Doug-las 



Hence the following general conclusion may be confidently 

 drawn, " That the idea of breaking the enemy's line was first 

 suggested to Sir Charles Douglas by the opening he observed 

 in it, who pressed it upon his Admiral almost beyond the de- 

 gree of courtesy due from an inferior to his superior officer, 

 from the important advantages that could not fail to result from 

 it ; that this manoeuvre could not have been recommended either 

 by Mr Clerk or his writings, because it was the offspring of the 

 peculiar circumstances in which the two opposite fleets were 

 placed ; and moreover, though not then treated of by Mr Clerk, 

 was by other tacticians known to be dangerous, unless under 

 the peculiar advantages which had thus accidentally occurred.'' 



" I have refuted," says he, " the assertions which reflect upon my father 

 as an honourable man, and an accomplished officer. That is enough for me 

 as his son, I shall now investigate the subject tactically, to correct many 

 wrong notions which inexperienced officers might be led to form, from the 

 unqualified manner in which Mr Clerk's theories have been lauded, in urging 

 pretensions which some professional men proclaim to be grand discoveries in the 

 science of naval tactics.''^ 



He then examines the reasoning of the Edinburgh reviewer, 

 and proves that he does not even understand the language em- 

 ployed in naval discussions, and from his ignorance of nautical 

 phraseology, confounds two very different operations ; and con- 

 sequently, that no confidence can be placed in his deductions. 

 The advocate does not even know the difference between the 

 sea phrases to hear up or away^ arid to haul up^ or to haul the 

 wind *. 



Sir H. Douglas, page 59, remarks : — 



" Mr Clerk, in his theory of the cross attack from the leeward, (which was 

 published for the first time in 1700, and forms no part of the previous tract of 

 1782), assumes that the lee fleet may penetrate a fleet standing athwart to 

 windward, in any one point, and so cut it in twain ; that the incision may 

 either be made in the enemy's van, centre, or rear, and that whichever of 

 these be chosen by the fleet bearing up from the leeward^ as his advocate calls 

 it, (but should have been hauling up), stemming close-hauled towards the 

 broadside batteries of the enemy, that the windward fleet must be cut in 

 twain at that one point, or otherwise the leader, getting foul of the lee ship, at 

 that interval, wiU stop her course, and that of all her followers, (without 

 stopping his own, which are precisely under similar circumstances, — ^for other- 

 wise there is a gap, an enormous gap), throw all their stemmost ships into 

 confusion, whilst he gets clear, maintains his order, and forces th£m to leeward. 



« See Steel's Seamanship, Second Edition, London, 1807, pages 131 and 140. 



