GENERAL ZOOLOGY. 71 



he has mystified himself by an equivocal use of the term, " real existence." 

 He proceeds — u Such conceptions, which have no real existence, but can be 

 defined ideally by a certain collection of characters, are called Types of 

 Animal Organization. Accordingly, we speak of the types of Genus, 

 Family, Class, &c, and we endeavour to discover by observation the essen- 

 tial properties of each, and to express them in words. These words con- 

 stitute the character of the group ; they convey the definition of the idea, 

 and contain the marks by which the type may be known, and which, there- 

 fore, are considered as typical of the group." This, we see, is in allusion 

 to, but not quite in accordance with, the doctrine of Linnaeus, that the 

 character does not make the genus, but the converse. That very real 

 existence of species, to which Burmeister yet clings — as it seems, however, 

 not without a wavering faith even as to this — as the last floating straw of 

 a drowning system^ is just as truly an abstraction of the mind as any of 

 the higher groups. Define it as we will, the idea of species comprehends 

 some relation which cannot be seen, felt, or exhibited corporeally — such as 

 that of continuous generation from one stock ; or, if we admit that no irre- 

 fragable proof has yet been adduced of the necessary descent of all 

 the individuals of a species from one original pan-, or parent, then our 

 idea of species must differ still less in kind from that of any higher group. 

 We must be able to conceive, as possible at least, if we do not actually 

 assume as true, the original existence of several individuals and one species, 

 to which they are subordinated not by that peculiar relation of Generation, 

 but by other agreements, of the same sort, and only greater, in number 

 or degree, than, those we recognize among the higher groups, and in the 

 one case as in the other, coupled with Differences ; — whether these be 

 Specific, Generic, or simply Individual, does not materially affect the pre- 

 sent question. In this case, whether we trace these correspondences up 

 to Creative Design, or view them simply in reference to our own Modes 

 of Perception, the result is equally that those Relations and Agreements, 

 and, consequently, also^ the Groups connoted, or denoted, by the character, 

 have a Real existence as truly in the Higher (genus, &c), as in the Lower 

 (species) — yet not Lowest group so long as some individuals of the Species 

 present fewer differences and more points of agreement among themselves 

 (Races, Varieties, &c), than others. Again, whatever be our Idea of 

 " Species" abstractedly, the Character of any particular species is a collec- 

 tion of marks of a precisely similar nature with those which make up the 

 character of a Genus, or any higher group, differing only in being more 

 numerous and particular, inasmuch as the character of the Species includes 



