HORACE ON INSANITY. 279 



which there is clearly a real motive, to revenge the murder of his 

 father. Orestes was suffering neither under delusion nor false im- 

 pressions, nor was there any perversion of the natural feelings and 

 affections (for such perversion must be without just cause) ; he rea- 

 soned rightly on real grounds, the power of doing which constitutes, 

 in general terms, soundness of mind. His insanity commenced after 

 the commission of the deed, and took its origin in remorse and hor- 

 ror at the magnitude of his crime. It was, however, only of tem- 

 porary duration, and we find that he had entirely recovered at no 

 long period afterwards. 



Horace was fully aware of the great difficulty of distinguishing 

 between these two species of insanity; for crime is, as has been 

 before observed, the effect of an aberration of reason ; and the man 

 who commits a murder while under the influence of evil passions is 

 not really in a sound state of mind. Struck with this view of the 

 case, Horace asks — 



" au commotse crimine mentis, 

 Absolves hominem, et sceleris damnabis eundem, 

 Ex more imponens cognata vocabula rebus ?" 



It has been frequently remarked, that no knowledge is so diffi- 

 cult of acquirement as self-knowledge ; and yet none is of more im- 

 portance to man, whether as regards his happiness in this world or 

 his prospects in that to come. It would, indeed, be well if we were 

 to commence the task of self-examination, and to put to our own 

 breasts the question which the poet puts to the stoic philosopher : — 



" QuE me stultitia, quoniam non est genus unum 

 Insanire putas ? Ego nam videor mihi sanus :" 



and fortunate if the result of the examination induces the confes- 

 sion, however humiliating, proceeding from a conviction of our own 

 innate depravity : — 



" Stultum me fateor (liceat concedere veris) 

 Atque etiam insanum." 



Thus much and more may be elicited from a single satire of Ho- 

 race. How much of philosophy, of knowledge of mankind, of 

 shrewd observation, and, in many cases, of excellent moral precept, 

 may we not derive from the same source ! This, I think, is at least 

 an argument in favour of a classical education, and a proof that the 



