June 4. 1853.] 



NOTES AND QUERIES. 



553 



combat of the knight with the lion. The knight is 

 holding his shield in front, and holding his sword 

 in his left hand. This seal is that of Roger de 

 Quincy, earl of Winchester, and appended to a 

 deed " m.cc. Quadrlgesimo Quinto." It occurs in 

 Harl. MSS. 6079. p. 127. E. G. Ballard. 



Pray request Senex to withdraw every word he 

 has said about me. I do not recollect that I ever 

 said or wrote a word about the Seal of William 

 D'AlbinI ; and I cannot find that my name occurs 

 in Dr. Barrett's volume. Edw. Hawkins. 



"will and "shall. 

 (Vol. vii., p. 356.) 



The difficulty as to the proper use of the auxi- 

 liaries shall and will, will be found to arise from 

 the fact, that while these particles respectively 

 convey a different Idea in i\iQ first person singular 

 and plural, from that which they imply in the 

 second and third persons singular and plural, the 

 distinction has been lost sight of in the amalgam- 

 ation of both ; as if they were interchangeable, 

 in one tense, according to the old grammatical 

 formula / shall or will. With a view of giving my 

 own views on the subject, and attempting to sup- 

 ply what appears to me a grammatical deficiency, 

 I shall proceed to make a few remarks ; from 

 which I trust your Hong Kong correspondent 

 W. T. M. may be able to Jbrm " a clear and defi- 

 nite rule," and students of English assisted in their 

 attempts to overcome this formidable conversa- 

 tional " shibboleth." 



The fact is simply thus : — Will is volitive in the 

 first persons singular and plural ; and simply de- 

 clarative or promissory in the second and third 

 persons singular and plural. Shall, on the other 

 hand, is declaratory or promissory in the first per- 

 son singular and plural ; volitive in the second and 

 third singular and plural. Thus, the so-called 

 future is properly divisible into two tenses : the 

 first Implying influence or volition ; the second (or 

 future proper) intention or promise. Thus : 



1. 



I will go. 

 Thou shalt go. 

 He shall go. 

 We will go. 

 You shall go. 

 They shall go. 



I shall go. 

 Thou wilt go. 

 He will go. 

 We shall go. 

 You will go. 

 They will go. 



When the above is thoroughly comprehended 

 by the pupil, it will be only necessary to impress 

 upon his mind (as a concise rule) the necessity of 

 making use of a different auxiliary in speaking of 

 the future actions of others, when he wishes to con- 

 vey the same idea respecting such actions which he 



has done, or should do, in speaking of his own, 

 and vice versa. Thus : 



I will go, and you shall accompany me. 



(i. e. it is my wish to go, and also that you shall 

 accompany me.) 



I shall go, and you will accompany me. 



(i.e. in is my intention to go; and believe, or 

 know, that it is your intention to accompany me.) 

 The philosophical reason for this distinction will 

 be evident, when we reflect upon the various ideas 

 produced In the mind by the expression of either 

 volition or mere intention (In so far as the latter is 

 distinguishable from active will) with regard to 

 our own future actions, and the same terms with 

 reference to the future actions of others. It will 

 be seen that a mere intention in the first person, 

 becomes influence when it extends to the second 

 and third; we know nothing a priori (as it were) 

 of the intentions of others, except in so far as we 

 may have the power of determining them. When 

 I say "/ shall go" (firai), I merely express an 

 intention or promise to go ; but if I continue " You 

 and they shall go," I convey the idea that my in- 

 tention or promise is operative on you and them ; 

 and the terms which I thus use become uninten- 

 tionally Influential or expressive of an extension 

 of my volition to the actions of others. Again, the 

 terms which I use to signify volition, with reference 

 to my own actions, are but declaratory or promis- 

 sory when I speak of your actions, or those of 

 others. I am conscious of my own wish to go ; but 

 my wish not influencing you, I do, by continuing 

 the use of the same auxiliary, but express my be- 

 lief or knowledge that your wish is, or will be, 

 coincident with my own. When I say " I will go" 

 {je veux aller), I express a desire to go ; but if I 

 add, " You and they will go," I simply promise on 

 behalf of you and them, or express my belief or 

 knowledge that you and they will also desire to go. 



It is not unworthy of note, that the nice balance 

 between shall and will Is much impaired by the 

 constant use of the ellipse, "I'll, you'll," &c. ; and 

 that volition and intention are, to a great extent, 

 co-existent and inseparable In the first person : 

 the metaphysical reasons for this do not here 

 require explanation. 



I am conscious that I have not elucidated this 

 apparently simple, but really complex question, 

 in so clear and concise a manner as I could have 

 wished ; but, feeling convinced that my principle 

 at least is sound, I leave it, for better considera- 

 tion, in the hands of your correspondent. 



William Bates. 



Birmingham. 



Brightland's rule is, — 



" In the first person simply shall foretells ; 

 In will a threat or else a promise dwells : 



