On I he Moral fnjluente of iluioty^ 8 3 > 



that this could ncft be, unless history were 

 eminently useful as a moral instructor. Now 

 1 apprehend that this interest in history has no 

 respect to moral at all, but derives itself alto- 

 get her from tha,t curiosity of the human mind, 

 which impeJst<>; the pursuit of' knowledge of 

 ever^ kind, and from the passion for the grand, 

 whhout any regard to the useful or the moral. 

 13oth of these motives may be associated with 

 the useful and the moral, and they m^y and do 

 act as independent principles of human nature. 

 They are two very powerful stimulants of the 

 mind, and do alone account for niany striking 

 phenomena of man. To know, and merely to 

 know, is the business of man from -the cradle 

 to the grave ; it is^ the province of other prin- 

 ciples to apply the knowledge, whe^i acquired, 

 to >yi>atever purpose. Now if J^istory^ coii-^ 

 duced to no other end whatevery i^J^p the 

 gratification of this curiosity, man would bq 

 impelled to the cgaversation with history ; ibr, 

 curious to know every thing,- he could not be 

 incurious in a subject which so nauch regards 

 the actings of his own species. The useiViJ 

 and the moral may be the fruit of this kn(uv% 

 kdge, and they may not, but ci^rio^ity would 

 alone enforce the eiKjuiry. To this poy^ciliit 

 motive is added the passion for the grand, that 

 most fascinating and irresibtiblc impulse of the 

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