(hi Natural and Moral Ph'ilosoplnf. 401 



there must be no previous interest or concern 

 about the answer. Whatever tli^ory cannot 

 meet these tests, has not been attaiiud by the 

 same careful process as in natural philosophy; 

 it is not tlie ingenuous truth of human nature. 

 Deceit, both of ourselves and our fellow nian, 

 frequently insinuates itself into moral as well as 

 physical enquiries, by confounding the neces- 

 sar\' consequences of phenomena with the 

 causes of the phenomena, especially when these 

 causes are not obvious to the sense. Now the 

 question is not whether the moral, and the 

 useful as a consequence, may not generally, or 

 even always be found to coincide. But if the 

 attributes of man, and what is primary in him, 

 be the subject of enquiry, from what principle 

 does the mind imperiously decide ? What, as 

 fitted to the temper of the mind, constitutes th{» 

 attraction to the moral? Is it, becduse we 

 connect it with the idea of utility ; or srmply, 

 that it appears in the character of a beautiful 

 object of sight ? That the useful should be the 

 consequent, is nothing wonderful, when the 

 whole isteferred to the provicJcncebfthe b^* 

 nevolent Creator. But It deserves consideration, 

 that in manv instances, the useful in the cvc of 

 the Creator neither is, nor can be, in thl^ con- 

 templation of man, bemg? indeed beyond the 

 reach of' hjs ken ; iand thafp ci-epjwitb tlifi.bcst 



