402 On Ndtitral and 'Moral ^Philosopki/. 



intentions, mai\ often entertains very erroneous 

 conceptions, of utility. It is, indeed, a most 

 fortunate truth, that, our judgment of the moral 

 is much more correct than our judgment of the 

 useful. . .r 



. It is another question, that if by utility as 

 the origin of all moral judgment be understood 

 a regard to the greatest public good j what is 

 it that carries the individual out of himself, and 

 makes the interest of others desirable to him? 

 This very desire is the surrender of the whole 

 theory,, it is the acknowledgment of the bene- 

 volent principles as the origin, of benevolence, 

 the most dignified of all the moral virtues. If 

 it be answered, that public utility is regarded 

 only as it involves the interest of self, and is 

 the best security for it, the theory of general 

 utility as* the origin of moral judgment resolves 

 itself into the selfish scheme, and must stand or 

 fall with it. To this therefore I advert in few 

 words, and ask the defenders of the Selfish 



Systemj- ' >. : . 



Is it a promineitt fact in human nature, that 

 th-e moral judgment i^ measured by the interest 

 of the judging mind ? ;l$.iij a fact, ih^t the eye 

 of the mind is turned upon self, upon its own 

 convenience, utility,.,- and advantage^; before it 

 dare to pronounce the sentence of right and 

 wrong, of approbation and disapprobation? 



