12(J PLYMOUTH INSTITUTION 



these were carefully noted, with the various occasions on which 

 they were chiefly displayed, Cicero commenced to note the corres- 

 ponding actions as signs or indications of virtue. 



Having finished the business of notation, Cicero commenced his 

 rhetorical arrangement, by selecting the most appropriate heads for 

 his speech. This selection was determined by the number and 

 nature of the actions afforded by the subject of his praise or com- 

 mendation. If, for instance, his actions were more remarkable for 

 prudence or justice, than for magnanimity or fortitude, the former 

 would occur to the orator as the most appropriate heads of his 

 speech. 



The rhetorical arrangement being finally determined by the selee 

 t ion of appropriate heads, nothing remained for the orator, but i<> 

 * \cit 1 1 is genius in the composition of his speech. 



We regret that our limits will not admit of our even ulain 

 l!ie remainder of tins very interest in- 1< < fire. 



JANUARY 23RD. Mr. BAUM-, O// Mo/,,1 

 The lecturer defined Moral Philosophy as the popular name 

 under which is comprehended the ,SV ///< v and Art of morals 

 or morality. He subsequently stated that, at different times 

 and by different authors, several different origins had l>een assigned 

 to moral obligation, all of which were included in one or other of 

 the following positions. 



I. Moral obligation results from the existence of a moral sense 

 in man. 



II. Moral obligation proceeds from a specific difference in the 

 essential qualities of human actions. 



III. Moral obligation is the consequence only of a Superior Will. 



IV. Moral obligation is the consequence of no one of the above 

 named causes, but of combinations of any two of them, or of the 

 three together. 



Thus there are seven causes assigned for the existence of moral 

 obligation. 



In proceeding to the examination of these propositions, the lectu- 

 rer observed that it was necessary to enquire into the existence of the 

 moral sense : after a long train of argument he gave it as his opinion 

 that the doctrine of the existence of a moral sense could not be sus- 

 tained, and that, consequently, all arguments founded on its exist- 

 ence must be fallacious ; therefore four of the CAUSES above mention- 

 ed required no further consideration, because the moral sense is, at 

 least, an clement in them. The remaining causes are, I. a specific 



