PLYMOUTH INSTITUTION. 127 



difference in the essential qualities of human actions ; II. a superior 

 Will; III. the two together. 



The lecturer then quoted the arguments of Bayle, in favor of the 

 first of these three, and adduced some reasons for considering them 

 inefficient; and observed, the position then that moral obligation 

 results from the existence of natural specific differences of human 

 actions, or the perception of such differences, is unestablished. He 

 then proceeded to prove that the existence of natural specific differ- 

 ence in the essential qualities of human actions, in conjunction with 

 the Superior Will, is necessary to account for moral obligation. 



Mr. Barnes quoted the following hypothesis of Locke, " Good 

 and evil are nothing but pleasure and pain, or that which occasions 

 or procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good and evil 

 then is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary 

 actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by 

 the will and power of the law maker; which good and evil, 

 pleasure or pain attending our observance or breach of the law, 

 by the decree of the law maker, is that we call reward and punish- 

 ment; of these laws there are three species, viz., the Divine law, 

 having influence here or hereafter ; Civil law, having forcible influ- 

 ence in this life ; and the law of Opinion, with its sanction of fame 

 or infamy ." This hypothesis was considered by the lecturer as 

 sufficient to account for the existence of moral impressions in all 

 cases in which such impressions are found to exist : he further 

 showed that it accounted for the variation in men's notions of right 

 and wrong, with regard to the same action ; as well as for the dif- 

 ferent moral impressions, produced in different individuals, amongst 

 ourselves, for the forgiveness of an insult. He concluded his paper 

 to the following effect. 



The specific moral qualities of actions are the relations of their 

 specific natural qualities and relations to the laws of the Divine 

 Will. Before then a knowledge of the specific moral qualities of 

 actions can be attained, their specific natural qualities and relations 

 must be carefully observed. These specific natural qualities and 

 relations being observed, it still remains to obtain at least some 

 general Divine law, before the specific moral qualities can be 

 known ; since these latter are the relations between such specific 

 natural qualities and relations and such law. 



The lecturer intimated that the induction necessary to this, should 

 be the subject of another lecture. 



