against those countries which have not paid 

 fines and assessments. However, these pro- 

 cedures are not expected to include specific 

 numbers or types of violations which would 

 mandate nonrenewal of GIFAs or nonissuance 

 of permits. 



The Coast Guard has indicated that record- 

 ing violations on the permits of individual 

 fishing vessels may constitute one of the most 

 potent regulatory tools available. 30 A system 

 which works much like the points system 

 used in revocation of drivers licenses and set- 

 ting insurance rates is probably worth in- 

 vestigating in connection with fisheries per- 

 mits. Such a system could be used initially in 

 foreign fisheries, but would be equally useful 

 in the domestic fisheries should some form of 

 limited entry be adopted. 



Under the law, GIFAs are negotiated by the 

 State Department. However, the State Depart- 

 ment has been given no regulatory functions. 

 Therefore, the law may have to be amended in 

 order to charge the State Department with 

 preparing such guidelines for its negotiations 

 or these guidelines could be prepared by 

 NMFS along with guidelines to be considered 

 in granting permits. Without these specific 

 guidelines as to what violations constitute 

 grounds for nonissuance of permits or GIFAs, 

 it is likely that uneven and inefficient use of 

 this potential tool will result. 



It appears that the second strategy, the ex- 

 tensive use of observers onboard foreign fish- 

 ing vessels, could be vital to the success of en- 

 forcement in the 200-mile zone. 



Current plans call for placing observers on- 

 board 10 to 20 percent of the foreign vessels 

 granted permits to fish in U.S. waters. These 

 observers will be NMFS personnel who will 

 have no enforcement duties. They will be 

 assigned randomly to vessels of foreign na- 

 tions which in the past have been suspected of 

 giving NMFS incomplete or inaccurate reports 

 on their fishing activity. 



The present plan is to place about 20 observ- 

 ers on vessels in the Georges Bank area of the 

 Northeast fisheries and slightly fewer in the 

 Northwest fisheries, primarily Alaska. The 

 National Marine and Fisheries Service has 

 estimated the annual cost of the program at 

 approximately $750,000. The cost per ship, 

 with an observer onboard, may be as high as 

 $15,00031 for a cruise of several weeks. Under 

 the terms of Public Law 94-265, which re- 

 quires that foreign fishing vessels pay 

 reasonable fees to compensate the United 

 States for expenses incurred in the course of 

 fishery conservation, management, research, 

 administration, and enforcement, costs for ob- 

 servers will be billed to the individual ship 

 carrying the observers. 32 



The cost will probably make little difference 

 to vessels from countries which subsidize 

 their fishermen. However, such a charge may 

 not be taken lightly by fishermen who are in- 

 dependent operators. Since the vessels to carry 

 observers will be chosen randomly within any 

 particular country, levying the charge against 

 the individual vessels may strain relations be- 

 tween foreign fishermen and the observer 

 who must live onboard their vessel for ex- 

 tended lengths of time and make it much more 

 difficult for the observer to gather accurate 

 data. In the interests of easing this relation- 

 ship, OTA suggests that charges for observers 

 be spread evenly among all the ships in the 

 fishing fleet of a particular nation. The law re- 

 quires that the fee schedule which sets out 

 charges to foreign fishermen be determined by 

 the Secretary of Commerce in consultation 

 with the Secretary of State. 33 Therefore, a 

 revised billing procedure for observer costs 

 could be recommended to Commerce by State 

 based on its negotiations with foreign nations. 



39 



