Sheldon — The Literature of Ethical Science. 1 15 



the point is the same. On the practical side, it is the ques- 

 tion : could the conscience still continue to exert its influence 

 without the God-belief ; while on the side of theory it is 

 simply a question : is there a certain natural linkage or rela- 

 tion of dependence here, and if so, of what kind? 



Almost every conceivable attitude of mind on this phase 

 of the whole problem is represented by one or more of the 

 modern scholars in ethical science. We have the negative 

 view in the denial of any relationship here, — as illustrated in 

 the old-fashioned, aggressive atheism and materialism still 

 advocated by A, Diihring, of Germany, who is a most pro- 

 lific writer, but not of course of the first rank. In his 

 " Werth des Lebens," we come upon an emphatic denial of 

 the very possibility of soul, immortality, or God, with an 

 effort to found an ethics exclusively on sympathy and human 

 affections. Then, too, there is the "atom-soul" and the 

 naive ethical monism of Haeckel, which is, however, only a 

 sugar-coated, sentimental atheism and materialism. In the 

 French scholar, Guyau, we likewise have a denial of duty, 

 immortality and God, with a scheme for founding a morality 

 sans obligation ni sanction. There was the brilliant mathe- 

 matician, Clifford, giving a lecture on " Cosmic Emotion," or 

 writing essays on "Ethics and Religion," and substituting a 

 " Father-Man " in place of a " Father-God." We have the 

 rather mournful negative agnosticism of an Edith Simcox, 

 who yet would offer us a high subjective ethical Idealism quite 

 independent of any God-belief. There is the " kosmisches 

 Lebensgefiihl " of Hoffding. According to Janet, religion 

 adds completeness to the moral life without being absolutely 

 essential to it. Then there is the ethical, impersonal theism 

 of Matthew Arnold with his definition of religion as, 

 " morality touched with emotion," and his description of the 

 God-conception as " The Eternal, not ourselves, that makes 

 for righteousness." 



For a scholar like Robert Flint, in his lectures on 

 "Theism," conscience is a "delegated authority." — 

 " Whose is this perfect authoritative supreme will to which all 

 consciences point back? Whose, if not God's? " And for a 



