426 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 



logical truth, on the whole) in a supposed state of information ; no 

 character being counted twice over knowingly in the supposed state of 

 information. The depth, like the breadth, may be certain or doubtful, 

 actual or potential, and there is a comprehensive distinctness corre- 

 sponding to extensive distinctness. 



The informed breadth atid depth suppose a state of information 

 which lies somewhere between two imaginary extremes. These are, 

 first, the state in which no fact would be known, but only the meaning 

 of terms ; and, second, the state in which the information would amount 

 to an absolute intuition of all there is, so that the things we should 

 know would be the very substances themselves, and the qualities we 

 should know would be the very concrete forms themselves. This sug- 

 gests two other sorts of breadth and depth corresponding to these two 

 states of information, and which I shall term respectively the essential 

 and the substaiitial breadth and depth. 



By the essential depth of a term, then, I mean the really conceivable 

 qualities predicated of it in its definition. 



The defined terra will not perhaps be applicable to any real objects 

 whatever. Let, for example, the definition of the term T be this, 



Any T is both P' and P" and P'", 



then this sums up its whole meaning; and, as it may not be known 

 that there is any such thing as P', the meaning of T does not imply 

 that it exists. On the other hand, we know that neither P', P", nor 

 P'" is coextensive with the whole sphere of being. For they are de- 

 terminate qualities, and it is the very meaning of being that it is 

 indeterminate, that is, is more extensive than any determinate term. 

 In fact, P', for example, is a real notion which we never could have 

 except by means of its contrast to something else. Hence we must 



know that 



Whatever is not-P' is not-T, 



Whatever is not-P" is not-T, 



and Whatever is not-P"' is not T. 



Thus if we define the essential breadth of a term as those real thinars 

 of which, according to its very meaning, a term is predicable, not-T 

 has an essential breadth. We may therefore divide all terms into 

 two classes, the essentially affirmative or positive and the essentially 



