290 PROCEEDINGS OP THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 



hand, when such a conception has once been obtained, there is, in 

 general, no reason why the premises which have occasioned it should 

 not be neglected, and therefore the explaining conception may fre- 

 quently be prescinded from the more immediate ones and from the im- 

 pressions. 



§ 6. The facts now collected afford the basis for a systematic method 

 of searching out whatever universal elementary conceptions there may 

 be intermediate between the manifold of substance and the unity of 

 being. It has been shown that the occasion of the introduction of a 

 universal elementary conception is either the reduction of the manifold 

 of substance to unity, or else the conjunction to substance of another 

 conception. And it has further been shown that the elements conjoined 

 cannot be supposed without the conception, whereas the conception 

 can generally be supposed without these elements. Now, empirical 

 psychology discovers the occasion of the introduction of a conception, 

 and we have only to ascertain what conception already lies in the data 

 which is united to that of substance by the first conception, but which 

 cannot be supposed without this first conception, to have the next con- 

 ception in order in passing from being to substance. 



It may be noticed that, throughout this process, introspection is not 

 resorted to. Nothing is assumed respecting the subjective elements 

 of consciousness which cannot be securely inferred from the objective 

 elements. 



§ 7. The conception of being arises upon the formation of a prop- 

 osition. A proposition always has, besides a term to express the sub- 

 stance, another to express the quality of that substance ; and the 

 function of the conception of being is to unite the quality to the sub- 

 stance. Quality, therefore, in its very widest sense, is the first concep- 

 tion in order in passing from being to substance. 



Quality seems at first sight to be given in the impression. Such 

 results of introspection are untrustworthy. A proposition asserts the 

 applicability of a mediate conception to a more immediate one. Since 

 this is asserted, the more mediate conception is clearly regarded indepen- 

 dently of this circumstance, for otherwise the two conceptions would not 

 be distinguished, but one would be thought through the other, without 

 this latter being an object of thought, at all. The mediate conception, 

 then, in order to be asserted to be applicable to the other, must first be 

 considered without regard to this circumstance, and taken immediately. 

 But, taken immediately, it transcends what is given (the more imme- 



