366 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 



on this whole subject. It is almost sure to mislead a beginner, when 

 he first meets with it. It seems very plausible, when it is seen in the 

 large print of a grammar, with si vales, bene est, or some other standard 

 example to confirm it. But a single example, taken at random from 

 Cicero, is enough to show the falsity of the pi'inciple as it is commonly 

 understood : — Si omnia antecedentibus causis Jiunt, omnia naturali 

 conligatione consert econtexteque fiunt ; quod si est, omnia necessitas 

 efficit ; id si verum est, nihil est in nostra potestate ; est autem aliquid 

 in nostra potestate : at si omnia fato fiunt, omnia causis antecedenti- 

 bus fiunt : non igitur fato fiunt quaecumque fiunt. Cic. De Fato, XIV. 

 31. Here certainly are four conditions stated in the present indica- 

 tive, but each is stated only to be proved contrary to fact. It seems 

 evident that such grammarians as Zumpt could never have intended 

 their rule to be thus understood : Zumpt indeed, adds a note (to § 517), 

 in which he explains that what is assumed as certain with respect to 

 the inference {in Bezug auf die Folgerung) need not he certain either 

 in fact or in the speaker's belief. This modification would carry the 

 principle, even if it were a true one, entirely beyond the reach of those 

 for whose use it is stated ; for school-boys will be hardly expected to 

 draw the line very accurately between conditions which can be as- 

 sumed as certain (however incorrectly) and those which cannot. We 

 must recollect also that the "indicative" in such rules includes the fu- 

 ture, as well as the present and past; so that in the sentence, si natu- 

 ram sequemur ducem, nunquam aberrabimus, we are to consider the 

 future as used because the certainty of the supposition is assumed. 

 The principle thus modified will therefore amount to nothing more than 

 this useless truism, that when we use the indicative (present, past, or 

 future) in a protasis, we assume something as really happening in either 

 present, past, or future time, and then state a conclusion which follows 

 from that assumption. But this would apply to almost any supposition 

 that we can make ; it certainly would apply to the subjunctive; — if, 

 (for example) sequamur were used for sequemur in the sentence given 

 above, the difference would be hardly perceptible, the meaning in both 

 cases being if we shall follow. But it is useless to discuss so obvious 

 a matter. The simple truth is that the indicative in such a protasis as 

 we are discussing expresses a mere supposition, and nothing more, with 

 no expression of the speaker's opinion as to its truth or falsity. It will 

 express the condition if all men are liars, as well as the condition if 

 truth is eternal. The time to which the supposition refers is of course 



