HORACE GRAY. 683 



credit to others he held himself up to the strictest standard applicable to 

 forms of literature in which originality is a more essential feature than 

 in opinion writing, and would say nothing as his own which another 

 judge had said before him. This, with a knowledge of the past which 

 seemed like a miracle, and a habit of condensing his own statements as 

 severe as his quotations from others were generous, made it appear as 

 if the larger part of his work was that of marshalling cases. But any 

 of his secretaries knows that it was not so ; and I suppose there is not 

 one of them who has not many times urged him, as I have so often 

 done, to incorporate in his opinion the forcible and brilliant original 

 reasoning which, as we listened to it, seemed to bring light into the 

 darkest corners of his subject. But he would only answer, ' You will 

 find it all there' (indicating a passage where another judge had said 

 something like it, but generally, as it seemed to us, not half so well), or 

 else he would point to the passage which can always be found some- 

 where in his opinions, usually near the end, in which his own matter 

 is stated with the condensation almost of a head-note, and would say, 

 ' Why does n't that cover it, after all? ' " 



His exposition was not the collocation of unrelated facts. Fair in his 

 statement, he did not put his opinion together until he saw the result 

 which his study and exposition would establish, and the bearing upon 

 that result of every precedent cited. This is conspicuous in Jackson v. 

 Phillips, 14 All. 539, where he established the extent of the great doc- 

 trine of charitable trusts, which has done so much for Massachusetts. 

 Here his language, without rhetorical exaggeration, has an unusual 

 stateliness. So firmly is the opinion put together, that it can be appre- 

 ciated fully only by reading it as a whole, but some of its paragraphs 

 may be taken as illustrations of his style. The court had to determine 

 the validity of a bequest made in 1861 to "create a public sentiment that 

 will put an end to negro slavery in this country." 



" The bequest itself manifests its immediate purpose to be to educate 

 the whole people upon the sin of a man's holding his fellowman in bond- 

 age ; and its ultimate object, to put an end to negro slavery in the United 

 States ; in either respect, a lawful charity. 



" It is universally admitted that trusts for the promotion of religion and 

 education are charities. Gifts for the instruction of the public in the 

 cure of the diseases of quadrupeds or birds useful to man, or for the 

 prevention of cruelty to animals (either by publishing newspapers on 

 the subject, or by providing establishments where killing them for the 

 market might be attended with as little suffering as possible), have been 

 held charitable in England. London University v. Yarrow, 23 Beav. 



