nity level make the interpretation, extrapolation, 

 and use of many observations very difficult. 

 Further, the differences between various crude 

 oils and between the hundreds of petroleum prod- 

 ucts in their physical and biological effects must 

 always be kept in mind. Comparative data gener- 

 ally are far too few to permit attaching any rela- 

 tive significance to production area or product 

 formulation in this review. 



Field Investigations 



The utility of many "after-the-fact" studies is 

 limited because of the lack of knowledge of prespill 

 conditions. Data are often collected without 

 proper controls for comparison, and knowledge of 

 natural local fluctuations and species composition 

 of animal populations is usually quite limited. For 

 these reasons conclusions about the impact of a 

 particular spill may vary. 



Ehrsam (1972) reported substantial immediate 

 kills of marine life from a fuel oil spill at 

 Anacortes, Wash., and concluded that if larval and 

 juvenile forms of certain organisms were killed, 

 the full impact of the spill may not be known for 

 some time. Katz (1972) observed intertidal tran- 

 sects of the same affected area and concluded that 

 the effects were minor and long-term effects would 

 be unlikely. Webber (1972) pointed out, however, 

 that these after-the-fact studies observed only a 

 small wedge of the total biota. Knowledge of sub- 

 tidal and benthic organisms as well as larvae and 

 juveniles was lacking. 



Other large spills have been studied in greater 

 detail and have contributed significantly to our 

 understanding of the gross effects of oil. Yet, they 

 have been unable to answer many important 

 questions on the effect of pollutant hydrocarbons 

 in the marine environment, and generalizations 

 learned from one spill may not apply to another 

 because each is different. 



Field observations of behavior and effects of oil 

 in Arctic ice environments are few. The U.S. 

 Coast Guard investigations in the Arctic have 

 primarily been directed toward gaining knowl- 

 edge to improve cleanup methods (Glaeser and 

 Vance, 1971; McMinn and Golden, 1973). Camp- 

 bell and Martin (1973) discussed possible large- 

 scale movements and persistence of oil spilled in 

 the Beaufort Sea. They suggested that the surface 

 waters of the Arctic Ocean and the winter waters 

 of Chedabucto Bay, Nova Scotia, might be com- 

 parable, particularly with regard to the physical 



FISHERY BULLETIN: VOL. 72, NO. 3 



behavior of oil. Chedabucto Bay is the site of the 

 grounding of the tanker Arrow in February 1970 

 with 2.8 million gallons of bunker C oil aboard. 

 Campbell and Martin (1973) found that highly 

 stable oil-water emulsions formed to a depth of 50 

 m throughout Chedabucto Bay. They described 

 conditions by which oil reaching the edge of the 

 pack ice could be distributed under the ice. 



Thomas ( 1973) also suggested that results of the 

 studies at Chedabucto Bay might in some respects 

 be applicable to spills in the Arctic. He observed 

 remobilization of oil from beneath the weathered 

 surface of deposits during the summers following 

 the Arrow spill and the subsequent re-oiling of 

 some intertidal areas, adding a chronic pollution 

 aspect to the spill. Extensive mortalities of soft- 

 shell clams and salt marsh cord grass, Spartina 

 alterniflora , resulted where this occurred. In other 

 areas, clams were visibly contaminated with oil 

 and clam fishing was closed, at least through the 

 summer of 1972 (Thomas, 1973). 



When the Torrey Canyon broke up near the 

 southwest coast of England in 1967, 15 million 

 gallons of Kuwait crude oil with a high aromatic 

 content were released. Efforts to cope with this 

 first super disaster depended principally upon 2 

 million gallons of toxic dispersant, which probably 

 caused more damage than the oil, most of which 

 had weathered at sea for a week or more before 

 reaching the shores. Many techniques for oil con- 

 tainment and control on the seas were attempted 

 during the time oil leaked from the tanker; the 

 fact that they all failed reveals the inadequacies of 

 our technology and preparedness for such 

 emergencies. 



Extensive investigations of the West Falmouth 

 spill by Blumer and his associates at Woods Hole 

 provide one of the best documentaries of an oil 

 spill. A total of 185,000 gallons of no. 2 fuel oil 

 (41% aromatic content) were spilled in 1969 from a 

 ruptured barge. Intertidal and subtidal benthic 

 organisms of all phyla were killed during the first 

 few days (Blumer and Sass, 1972). Blumer, Souza, 

 and Sass (1970) showed that the uptake of fuel oil 

 hydrocarbons by shellfish left them unfit for 

 human consumption. Later, Blumer and Sass 

 (1972) reported the continued persistence of fuel 

 oil hydrocarbons in the sediments after 2 yr. Al- 

 though there had been some degradation, the boil- 

 ing range and composition of the hydrocarbon 

 mixture was basically unchanged. 



The 1969 Santa Barbara blowout released an 

 estimated 5,000 barrels of crude oil per day ini- 



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