FISHERY BULLETIN VOL. 72, NO. 1 



results are hardly ac-ceptable because more fish- 

 ermen and vessels will probably be catching 

 less. 



6. Other suggested ma)iageme)it sti'ategies: 

 Reeves (1969) has proposed a hike in license 

 fees to eliminate the marginal or part-time 

 fishermen. He suggests that the present $10 

 yearly fee in Maine be raised $10 a year over 

 the next 9 yr to a top of $100. In 1969, a little 

 less than one-half of the lobster fishermen were 

 part-time. A part-time lobster fisherman is 

 defined as one who gains less than one-half of 

 his aniRial income from lobstering. The first 

 step in most suggested limited entry schemes 

 is usually to restrict the fishery to full-time 

 utilization of cai)ital and labor. Two problems 

 occur with this policy. First, the part-time fish- 

 ermen may represent the most efficient way of 

 taking the catch. If so, the full-time fishermen 

 may be eliminated by increased license fees. 

 Second, license fees do not directly control fish- 

 ing effort since fishermen may fish more tra})s. 

 However, Reeves also goes on to argue strongly 

 for limiting the number of traps each fisherman 

 is allowed to set. It is not quite clear whether 

 anyone knows the optimum number of tra])s 

 per vessel. 



Rutherford. Wilder, and Frick (1967) in their 

 study of the Canadian inshore lobster fishery 

 endorse the system suggested by Sinclair (1960). 

 They state: 



"An alternative management system is that suggested 

 by Sinclair (1960) for the salmon fisheries of the Pacific 

 Coast. This would use the licensing of fishermen to 

 limit entry into the fishery. In the first stage, lasting 

 about five years, licenses would be reissued at a fee 

 but no new entries would be licensed, and it would be 

 hoped that during the period there would take place a 

 reduction in the labour and capital input, to take the 

 maximum sustainable catch of salmon at a considerably 

 lower cost. After the end of the first stage, licenses 

 would be issued by the government under competitive 

 bidding and only in sufficient numbers to appro.ximate 

 the most efficient scale of effort; the more competent 

 fishermen would be able to offer the highest bids and 

 it would be expected that the auction would recapture 

 for the public purse a large portion of the rent from 

 the fisheries that would otherwise accrue to the fishing 

 enterprises under the more efficient production condi- 

 tions in the fishery. 



"An arbitrary reduction in the number of fishermen 

 by restriction of licenses to a specified number would 

 entail injustice and inequity as well as grave administra- 

 tive problems in determining who should be allowed to 

 continue fishing. The auctioning of licenses to exploit 

 a public property resource is justifiable in a private 



enterprise system of production, particularly when the 

 state is incurring heavy expense to administer and con- 

 serve the resource: the recovery by the state of some part 

 of the net economic yield by means of a tax on fisher- 

 men (or on the catch) would recoup at least part of 

 such public expenditures, or could be used to assist 

 former fishermen (see strategies discussed above) for 

 instance, by buying their redundant equipment. A tax 

 on fishermen through the auctioning of licenses has, 

 at least, the merit of using economic means instead 

 of arbitrary regulations to achieve a desired economic 

 objective — the limitation of fishing effort to increase 

 the net economic yield from the fishery. Regulations 

 have to be enforced, usually at considerable cost, 

 but economic sanctions tend to be, if not impartial, 

 at least impersonal and automatic in their operation." 



Actually, this latter management scheme is 

 similar to the taxing scheme, but uses an 

 auction rather than a direct tax. 



Conclusions 



The purpose of this article is to explain the 

 use of bioeconomic models in assessing alter- 

 native management strategies. For this purpose 

 the data are less than optimal. However, this 

 does not mean that we cannot take steps in the 

 direction of fishery management. In fact, these 

 steps must be taken to protect the resource 

 from destruction and to achieve a better use 

 of vessels and fishermen. It is hoped that the 

 following conclusions will provide a helpful 

 framework in which to consider the merits of 

 limited entry: 



1. For the inshore American lobster resource, 

 there is every indication that the fishery has 

 achieved maximum sustainable yield and is 

 fully capitalized. This has been brought about 

 by a rapid expansion in effort (i.e.. traps fished) 

 produced by (1) free access to the resource, (2) 

 a rising market for lobsters of all species, and 

 (3) a secular decline in seawater temperature. 



2. We have presented the bioeconomic im- 

 pact of alternative management strategies to 

 both conserve the resource and use it efficiently. 

 The choice of which strategy to pursue is in the 

 public domain and beyond the scope of this 

 paper. However, the economic alternatives are 

 pointed out. 



LITERATURE CITED 



Bell, F. W. 



1972. Technological externalities and common proper- 

 ty resources: an empirical study of the U.S. 

 northern lobster fishery. J. Polit. Econ. 80:148-158. 



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