FISHERY BULLETIN: VOL. 70, NO. 2 



express its concern over the matter, and the is- 

 sue has been handled mainly through direct ne- 

 gotiations between the United States and South 

 Korea. The Japanese government has taken 

 some action to prevent the involvement of Jap- 

 anese companies in the Korean venture. The 

 amount of salmon taken by the Koreans is still 

 relatively small, perhaps in the order of several 

 hundred metric tons in 1970, but if Korean fish- 

 ing continues even at this rate it will seriously 

 affect the stability of the salmon situation in 

 the eastern North Pacific. 



Japan-Soviet Salmon Controversy 



Japan planned to send, in 1956, as many as 19 

 salmon motherships to the northwestern Pacific, 

 including the Okhotsk Sea, The Soviet govern- 

 ment issued, in February 1956, a unilateral dec- 

 laration to restrict salmon fishing in waters west 

 of long 170°E. There had been indications that 

 the Soviet government might take some action 

 to stop the phenomenal expansion of the Japa- 

 nese high seas salmon fisheries.'" 



The Soviet declaration included: establish- 

 ment, as an interim measure before the conclu- 

 sion of an appropriate international treaty, of 

 a salmon regulatory area covering the eastern 

 Bering Sea, the northwestern Pacific and the 

 Okhotsk Sea (Figure 7) to restrict salmon fish- 

 ing (by both Soviet and foreign nationals) dur- 

 ing the period of spawning migrations; estab- 

 lishment of a catch limit for 1956 at 50,000 

 metric tons; issuance, by the Soviet authorities, 

 of licenses for fishing in the area ; enforcement 

 of regulations by the Soviet authorities; and the 

 assurance that freedom of navigation in the area 

 would not be affected. The action taken by the 

 Soviet government was obviously related to ne- 

 gotiations for the normalization of diplomatic 

 relations which had come to a deadlock just be- 

 fore the Soviet declaration on fishing. 



" For example, at a meeting of the Economic Com- 

 mission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in 1955, 

 the Soviet delegation pointed out that the salmon stocks 

 in Kamchatka and other areas were in danger of being 

 destroyed because of overfishing by Japan. Also, during 

 negotiations for the normalization of diplomatic rela- 

 tions, which had been carried out in London, the Soviet 

 representative stressed the need for restricting fishing 

 for conservation of resources. 



Figure 7. — Salmon regulatory area for the 1956 season 

 and the initial salmon regulatory area under the 1956 

 treaty. 



The Japanese government proposed immedi- 

 ate negotiations on fishery matters and sent to 

 Moscow a team of top-notch experts headed by 

 the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. The 

 convention, along with its protocol specifying 

 regulatory measures and an agreement on emer- 

 gency rescues, was signed on May 15. The treaty 

 mentioned the maximum sustainable yield as the 

 main objective, established the Japan-Soviet 

 Fisheries Commission to consider joint conser- 

 vation measures, set an annual salmon catch 

 quota, and provided for enforcement of regula- 

 tory measures. The convention area was defined 

 as the entire area of the northwest Pacific Ocean 

 (excluding the territorial seas) including the 

 Japan Sea, the Okhotsk Sea, and the Bering Sea. 

 The protocol defined the regulatory area and 

 spelled out regulatory measures to be taken for 

 salmon, herring, and two species of king crab. 



The convention provided that it would become 

 effective upon entering into force of the peace 

 treaty or the restoration of diplomatic relations. 

 This undoubtedly speeded up peace negotiations, 

 resulting in a joint declaration (to end the state 

 of war and restore diplomatic relations) in De- 

 cember 1956. For all practical purposes, Japan's 

 claim to the southernmost islands of the Kurile 

 chain (which had been the main issue) was 

 shelved. In order to permit Japanese salmon 

 fishing for the 1956 season before the normali- 

 zation of diplomatic relations, the two govern- 



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