304 DARWIMANA. 



a different object, such, as a spider's web, lie would 

 ha^e inferred both design and non-human workman- 

 ship. Of some objects he might be uncertain wheth- 

 er they were of human origin or not, without ever 

 doubting they were designed, while of others this 

 might remain doubtful. Nor is man's recognition of 

 human workmanship, or of any other, dependent upon 

 his comprehending how it was done, or what particu- 

 lar ends it subserves. Such considerations make it 

 clear that " the label of human workmanship " is not 

 the generic stamp from which man infers design. It 

 seems equally clear that " the mental operation re- 

 quired in the one case " is not so radically or materially 

 " different from that performed in the other " as this 

 writer would have us suppose. The judgment re- 

 specting a spider's web, or a trap-door spider's dwell- 

 ing, would be the very same in this regard if it pre- 

 ceded, as it occasionally might, all knowledge of 

 whether the object met with were of human or ani- 

 mal origin. A dam across a stream, and the appear- 

 ance of the stumps of trees which entered into its 

 formation, would suggest design quite irrespective of 

 and antecedent to the considerable knowledge or ex- 

 perience which would enable the beholder to decide 

 whether this was the work of men or of beavers. 

 Why, then, should the judgment that any particular 

 structure is a designed work be thought illegitimate 

 when attributed to a higher instead of a lower intelli- 

 gence than that of man ? It might, indeed, be so if 

 the supposed observer had no conception of a power 

 and intelligence superior to his own. But it would 

 then be more than " irrelevant ; " it would be ini- 



