370 DARWmiANA. 



whole question resolves itself into one respecting the 

 ultimate veracity of Nature, or of the author of Na- 

 ture, if there be any. 



Passing from these attempts to undermine the 

 foundation of the doctrine — which we judge to be 

 unsuccessful — we turn to the consideration of those 

 aimed at the superstructure. Evidences' of design 

 may be relevant, but not cogent. They may, as Mill 

 thought, preponderate, or the wavering balance may 

 incline the other way. There are two lines of argu- 

 ment: one against the sufficiency, the other against 

 the necessity, of the principle of design. Design has 

 been denied on the ground that it squares with only 

 one part of the facts, and fails to explain others ; it 

 may be superseded by showing that all , the facts are 

 in the way of being explained without it. 



The things which the principle of design does not 

 explain are many and serious. Some are in their na- 

 ture inexplicable, at least are beyond the power and 

 province of science. Others are of matters which 

 scientific students have to consider, and upon which 

 they may form opinions, more or less well-grounded. 

 As to biological science — with which alone we are 

 concerned — it is getting to be generally thought that 

 this principle, as commonly understood, is weighted 

 with much more than it can carry. 



This statement will not be thought exaggerated 

 by those most familiar with the facts and the ideas of 

 the age, and accustomed to look them in the face. 

 Design is held to, no doubt, by most, and by a sure 

 instinct ; not, however, as always offering an explana- 

 tion of the facts, but in spite of the failure to do so. 



