THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES. 21 



scientifically. The one naturalist, perhaps too largely 

 assuming the scientifically unexplained to be inexpli- 

 cable, views the phenomena only in their supposed 

 relation to the Divine mind. The other, naturally 

 expecting many of these phenomena to be resolvable 

 under investigation, views them in their relations to 

 one another, and endeavors to explain them as far as 

 he can (and perhaps farther) through natural causes. 



But does the one really exclude the other ? Does 

 the investigation of physical causes stand opposed to 

 the theological view and the study of the harmonies 

 between mind and Nature ? More than this, is it not 

 most presumable that an intellectual conception re- 

 alized in Nature would be realized through natural 

 agencies ? Mr. Agassiz answers these questions affirm- 

 atively when he declares that " the task of science is 

 to investigate what has been done, to inquire if pos- 

 sible how it has ~been do?ie, rather than to ask what is 

 possible for the Deity, since we can know that only ~by 

 what actually exists ; " and also when he extends the 

 argument for the intervention in Nature of a creative 

 mind to its legitimate application in the inorganic 

 world ; which, he remarks, " considered in the same 

 light, would not fail also to exhibit unexpected evi- 

 dence of thought, in the character of the laws regulat- 

 ing the chemical combinations, the action of physical 

 forces, etc., etc." ' Mr. Agassiz, however, pronounces 

 that " the connection between the facts is only intel- 

 lectual " — an opinion which the analogy of the inor- 



1 Op. cit., p. 131. — One or two Bridgewater Treatises, and most 

 modern works upon natural theology, should have rendered the evi- 

 dences of thought in inorganic Nature not " unexpected." 



2 



