274 DARWINIAN A. • 



but he is bound to expect them all to fall within the 

 categoiy of what he calls natural selection (a most ex- 

 pansible principle), or to be congruous with it — that is, 

 that they shall be natural causes. Also — and this is 

 the critical point — he is bound to maintain their suffi- 

 ciency without intervention. 



Here, at length, we reach the essential difference 

 between Darwin, as we understand him, and Dr. 

 Hodge. The terms which Darwin sometimes uses, 

 and doubtless some of the ideas they represent, are 

 not such as we should adopt or like to defend ; and we 

 may say once for all — aside though it be from the 

 present issue — that, in our opinion, the adequacy of 

 the assigned causes to the explanation of the phenomena 

 has not been made out. But we do not understand 

 him to deny " purpose, intention, or the cooperation 

 of God " in Nature. This would be as gratuitous as 

 unphilosophical, not to say unscientific. "When he 

 speaks of this or that particular or phase in the course 

 of events or the procession of organic forms as not 

 intended, he seems to mean not specially and disjunc- 

 tively intended and not brought about by intervention. 

 Purpose in the whole, as we suppose, is not denied but 

 implied. And when one considers how, under what- 

 ever view of the case, the designed and the contingent 

 lie inextricably commingled in this world of ours, past 

 man's disentanglement, and into what metaphysical 

 dilemmas the attempt at unraveling them leads, we 

 cannot greatly blame the naturalist for relegating such 

 problems to the philosopher and the theologian. If 

 charitable, these will place the most favorable con- 

 struction upon attempts to extend and unify the opera- 



