3. Fishing Licenses 



The Government of Oman in 1991 granted 5 

 Omani companies block quotas for industrial fishing. 

 The licenses were granted as follows: Oman Fisheries 

 Company (5 trawlers), Protein Produce International 

 (8 longliners), Gulf of Oman (2 trawlers), Oman Sea 

 Company (3 trawlers), and Sadah Marine (1 trawler). 

 These companies parcel out their licenses to foreign 

 fishers in return for a percentage of the catch. 

 Twelve percent of the total catch is also retained by 

 the Omani Government as a royalty or licensing fee. 



4. International Agreements 



Oman has no bilateral fisheries agreements, nor 

 does it currently participate in joint fisheries ventures. 

 The Oman Fisheries Company is holding discussions 

 with potential joint venture partners from Spain and 

 the Far East, although any agreement would not go 

 into effect until 1995 at the earliest. The foreign 

 partner would operate vessels hired by the Omanis, 

 while the fisheries company would cover the cost of 

 operations. Omani trainees would learn the business 

 from the foreign nationals manning the vessels. 



5. Foreign Fishing 



Trawlers: In 1991, a total of fifteen trawlers 

 fished off the coast of Oman. Between 8 and 10 

 Korean trawlers, fifty meters in length, ply 

 Omani waters at the current time. Total 

 allowable catches for demersal fish are 18,000 

 metric tons per year. Reported catch for 1991 

 was 13,1 1 1 tons (table l). 13 The foreign trawlers 

 are prohibited from fishing at depths of less than 

 fifty meters, or within 10 miles of shore 

 (whichever is greater). Oman's Ministry of 

 Agriculture and Fisheries reports that the catches 

 of the foreign trawler fleet have fluctuated 

 between 1 1,000 tons and 18,000 tons from 1986 

 to 1991. Total figures for industrial fishing are: 

 1986 (13,353 tons), 1987 (13,807 tons), 1988 

 (17,911 tons), 1989 (11,255 tons), 1990(15,037 

 tons), and 1991 (13,111 tons). See table 1 for 

 information about species caught by the trawl 

 fleet. 



Longliners: Taiwan-registered longliners began 

 fishing Omani waters in 1989. During the 1989- 

 1990 season, as many as 19 longliners fished 



there. During the 1990-1991 season, only eight 

 longliners were given licenses, and in 1991- 

 1992, eleven licenses were issued. To the 

 consternation of some local fishermen, the Oman 

 Fisheries Company can now grant twenty to fifty 

 licenses to tuna longliners at a time. Those 

 licenses are currently held by Taiwan companies. 

 The longliners mostly target yellowfin tuna, but 

 catch marginal quantities of sailfish, marlin, 

 swordfish, mahi-mahi and shark (table 2). The 

 government limits the total allowable catch of 

 tuna to 35,000 tons per year. The longliners are 

 prohibited from fishing within 20 miles of shore. 

 Questions sometimes arise about how closely 

 these limits are observed. The longliner fishing 

 season runs from September through May. 



6. Transshipments 



Omani ports serve as transshipment points only 

 for distant-water fleets fishing in Omani waters. The 

 foreign licencees are prohibited from transferring 

 shipment at sea to mother vessels which carry the fish 

 to foreign markets, because the Omanis want to 

 ensure they receive their portion of the catch. Critics 

 of the foreign markets complain that transshipment at 

 sea in fact does take place. Muscat's port, Mina 

 Qaboos, at present can only accommodate four 

 vessels at any one time. The port is currently 

 undergoing expansion. 



7. Enforcement 



The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries places 

 observers on the foreign vessels which fish in Omani 

 waters. In recent months, at least two of the captains 

 of these ships have been deported for overfishing or 

 for using double nets, etc. Other ships have been 

 prohibited from fishing for periods ranging from 30 

 to 70 days. Critics of the monitoring complain that 

 the observers are poorly trained youth who have little 

 authority and have difficulty communicating both with 

 the ships' captains (because of language barriers) and 

 with the Omani Government (because of poor radio 

 transmission). The United States Agency for 

 International Development (USAID) is in the process 

 of providing training to the observers which should 

 improve their capabilities. While Oman could no 

 doubt benefit from broader and more forceful 

 enforcement, neither the Ministry not the Omani 

 Coast Guard has much scope to expand the 

 surveillance. 



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