In the Indian Ocean, the number of Taiwan 

 longliners has more than doubled since the mid-1980s, 

 from 127 vessels in 1985 to 276 vessels in 1990 

 (appendix H). As is the case in the Atlantic, vessels 

 tend to be of the 200-500GRT class, with a marked 

 increase in the nimiber of over 500GRT vessels in 1989 

 and 1990.'* Approximately 25 of these longliners are 

 actually based in this region, operating out of 

 Singapore, Mauritius, and Reunion." The rest of these 

 vessels are presumably based in Taiwan. 



In the Pacific Ocean, the Taiwan longliner fleet 

 consists of two groups: the smaller (less than lOOGRT) 

 vessels, based in the Federated States of Micronesia, 

 Guam, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Palau, and 

 Taiwan wliich target bigeye and yellowfin tuna for the 

 Japanese sashimi market; and larger vessels (150- 

 250GRT) based in American Samoa and Fiji, which 

 target albacore for canning.'" 



Purse Seiners: Tlie Taiwan purse seine fleet is 

 comparatively new. having begun its operations in 

 1981. The fleet, consisting of 1,000GRT vessels, 

 primarily targets yellowfin tuna and skipjack which is 

 transshipped via Guam or on carriers at sea directly to 

 the United States, Japan, or Thailand for caiuiing.-' 

 Tlie Taiwan purse seine fleet has increased dramatically 

 in size, from zero in 1980 to 46 vessels in 1991." 

 Effort is concentrated in the central-western Pacific 

 near Papua New Guinea, Micronesia, and Indonesia, 

 with a limited catch in tlie Indian Ocean. 



To increase its access to the Pacific distant-water 

 tuna fishery, Taiwan has informally discussed the 

 possibility of entering into a multilateral-type 

 arrangement for its regional fleet witli the South Pacific 

 Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA). The FFA was 

 established in 1979 to assist member countries develop 

 and manage their fisheries resources in a coherent and 

 coordinated way. Taiwan officials are seeking an 

 arrangement that would cover all gear types, but the 

 FFA prefers an agreement confined to purse seiners.-'' 



Labor Problems: As is the case with its ROK and 

 Japanese competitors, Taiwan tuna fleets face an acute 

 shortage of domestic labor. Although official statistics 

 indicate the number of distantwater fishery workers has 

 been fluctuating since 1986 (appendix 1), it is 

 reasonable to assume that a downward trend similar to 

 that in Japan should take hold. Taiwan officials have 

 amiounced plans to allow 50 percent of the crew on 

 Taiwan distant-water tuna vessels to be comprised of 

 foreign workers (foreign crews were limited to 33 

 percent in the past). Taiwan tuna vessels have 

 employed crews from China, the Philippines, 

 Indonesia, and Vietnam, but the need for foreign crew 

 members has increased as fewer Taiwan citizens choose 

 to work on fishing vessels.-' Despite these efforts, 

 though, it is expected that developing Asian countries 

 such as China and Indonesia will become important 

 players, particularly in distant-water tuna fisheries, 

 thanks largely to their comparatively cheap and 

 abundant labor.-'' 



With the concentration of distant-water purse seine 

 effort in the central western Pacific, many Pacific 

 Island nations have become concerned about possible 

 overfishing. In October 1992, eight members of the 

 Forum Fisheries Agency known as the "Nauru Group" 

 (Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall 

 Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon 

 Islands, and Tuvalu) signed an agreement which places 

 a limit on the mmiber of distant-water purse seine 

 vessels fishing in the central and western Pacific. The 

 vessels in this fishery mainly target skipjack and 

 yellowfin tuna and account for most of the catch in the 

 South Pacific region. Tlie signatories justified the need 

 for a limit by noting the rapid capitalization of this 

 fishery and its possible detrimental effects on tuna 

 stocks." 



II. Promotion of Shipbuilding 



Taiwan no longer officially promotes building 

 fishery vessels and is, in fact, actively discouraging 

 investment in this sector. Taiwan officials invested 

 $221 million in building and upgrading fishing vessels 

 in 1990, but spent only $69 million for this purpose in 

 1991. Since 1991, Taiwan has instituted a freeze on 

 applications for new offshore fishing vessels and 

 imposed a zero-growth policy on the distant-water 

 fleet; i.e. only when an old vessel is retired will a new 

 vessel be approved. Taiwan officials have also 

 forbidden the purchase of foreign fishing vessels.-' 



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