the trawlers, processed it, and passed it on to 

 refrigerated fish carriers for transportation to 

 homeport. The commander's flagship, supplied with 

 fuel and other needs by tankers and cargo transports, 

 distributed these supplies among its vessels. This 

 system, which prevailed for the past 40 years, was 

 suddenly disrupted by the new political arrangements. 

 Each independent country now had to organize its 

 own support and transportation activities, and obtain 

 its own fuel (Georgia and Ukraine have no oil 

 resources and must, therefore, buy diesel oil firom 

 Russia or odier countries). In addition, the bilateral 

 agreements which were formerly negotiated by the 

 Soviet Ministry of Fisheries were no longer 

 necessarily valid. The Russian Federation, as the 

 internationally recognized successor state to the 

 Soviet Union, took over most of these agreements. 

 Ukraine and Georgia, therefore, have to make their 

 own arrangements to obtain access to foreign 200- 

 mile fishery zones. Georgia is especially 

 disadvantaged because its diplomatic corps and 

 political leverage are limited. 



All three CIS countries are currently undergoing 

 a major shake-up of their economic systems. In 

 Russia, the slow process of reform, until recently 

 hindered by a conservative parliament, has made 

 privatization more of a hope than a reality. In 

 Ukraine, a severe economic depression has negatively 

 affected the fishing industry. According to one 

 report, only a third of the Ukranian fishing fleet is 

 deployed in harvesting aquatic resources. No 

 information is available on the fate of the Georgian 

 high-seas fleet following the invasion and occupation 

 of its main fishing port of Poti by rebel troops on 

 October 10, 1993. All CIS republics suffer fi-om the 

 inability to provide their fishing fleets with sufficient 

 quantities of diesel fuel in a timely maimer. 

 Confirmed reports indicate that at times as much as 

 a half of the Russian fleet was idling in various ports 

 because of fuel shortages. Other reports describe an 

 even worse situation whereby vessels already 

 deployed on the high-seas had to stop their fishing 

 operations because fuel tankers did not reach them on 

 time. The authors of the regional reports have been 

 unable to verify any fuel shortages in Ukraine or 

 Georgia, but it must be assumed that a similar, if not 

 worse, situation prevails. 



Tlie future of the CIS fishing fleets will depend 

 on the ability of the tliree countries to obtain 

 necessary fishery resources to maintain the fleets' 



operations. Also important is the export of fishery 

 products to earn hard currencies with which to 

 modernize and replace the fleet, purchase diesel fuel, 

 and support operations in foreign fishing zones. The 

 joint fishery ventures with foreign companies and 

 arrangements to lease, charter, or sell fishery vessels 

 will become an important part of the future activities 

 of the CIS fishery administrators. Russia has a 

 natural advantage because its 200-mile EEZ contains 

 some of the most prolific fishing grounds in the 

 world. Ukrainian high-seas fishing operations will 

 probably have to be reduced along with the fleet. 

 The prospects for the Georgian fleet are bleak and it 

 remains to be seen whether it can continue 

 fimcdoning. 



F. EASTERN EUROPE 



The three major fishing countries in Eastern 

 Europe, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, have been 

 associated witli the Soviet Union in the so-called 5- 

 partite agreement (the former East Germany was die 

 fifth member) whose purpose was to help each other 

 develop high-seas fisheries. Although the Russian 

 Federative Soviet Socialist Republic, now the Russian 

 Federation, was the leading force behind the 

 expansion into the world's oceans, all three East 

 European countries rapidly developed their own 

 fishing fleets. Poland, also built an important and 

 productive network of fishery shipyards which built 

 hundreds of vessels over the past five decades. 



Romania and Bulgaria are both adjacent to the 

 Black Sea and their fisheries have been tradidonally 

 based on that body of water. In the 1960s, however, 

 they began to buy high-seas fishing and fishery 

 support vessels from the Soviet Union, Poland and 

 Germany, and to build the infrastructure for die 

 processing of landed fish. Along with the increase in 

 the fishery vessel tonnage, dieir marine catch grew 

 rapidly until the late 1970s when the coastal countries 

 began to extend fishery jurisdictions to 200-iniles. 

 Neither Romanian nor Bulgarian fishery 

 administrators were able to adapt themselves to the 

 new conditions. As a result, Uieir catch began to 

 stagnate and finally decrease rapidly; soon the aging 

 fleet became more of a burden than an asset. 



The outlook for both industries is bleak, and the 

 lack of rapid privatization helps to perpetuate tlie 

 inbred inefficiency of large government-owned 



