transshipment of the catch, refueling, 

 resupplying, and vessel maintenance and 

 repairs. These activities can become very 

 difficult, and even dangerous, when heavy 

 wave action on the high seas prevents the 

 vessels from anchoring side-by-side. On the 

 other hand, for a fishing vessel to unload its 

 catch and refuel back in the distant homeport 

 is prohibitively time-consuming and 

 expensive. A fishing fleet, operating in 

 distant waters may therefore seek the use of 

 nearby ports. From 1950 through 1990, the 

 Soviet Union established many bunkering and 

 transshipment points wherever its vessels 

 fished. These port arrangements have been 

 inherited by the Russian Federation. Among 

 the most important are Singapore (servicing 

 Russian fishing fleets operating in the Indian 

 and Pacific Oceans); the Canary Islands 

 (servicing the fleets in the eastern Atlantic); 

 Havana, Cuba (servicing the Russian fleets in 

 the western Atlantic), and Vaccamonte, 

 Panama (for vessels fishing in the eastern 

 Pacific). Although these are the most 

 important transshipment points, it must be 

 stressed that at one time or another the 

 Russian fishing fleets have bunkered in 

 practically every major port of the world. 



The Soviets usually establish joint 

 venture companies in the ports they frequent. 

 For example, in June 1975, they formed a 

 seafood processing firm in Singapore jointly 

 with the Development Bank of Singapore. 

 The company, Marisco Ltd., built a large 

 cold storage plant that processes and stores 

 fishery landings unloaded from Soviet 

 trawlers. Singapore's location, halfway 

 between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, was 

 ideal for the Soviet fishing fleet, which 

 operated extensively in both. 



Similarly, a Soviet joint venture with 

 Spain, SOVHISPAN, has been functioning 



successfully since 1969 when it was 

 established. The company's specific purpose 

 was to develop a supply and transshipment 

 base for the Soviet (now Russian) fishing 

 fleets in the Canary Islands. New port 

 installations have been built at Las Palmas 

 and at Santa Cruz de Tenerife. The Soviet 

 fishing crews were airlifted from the Canaries 

 in a system of crew rotations; the base was 

 also used as a rest and recreation point. Its 

 significance as a trading center for 

 Soviet/Russian fishery products has been well 

 known to the world's fish trading companies, 

 especially in Western Europe. 



In Havana, Cuba, the establishment of a 

 Soviet fisheries base soon became a politically 

 charged subject, especially when the Castro 

 regime, backed by the Soviets, used fishing 

 vessels to launch terrorist attacks in an effort 

 to destabilize the neighboring countries in 

 Latin America. The Soviet flsheries 

 agreement with Cuba demanded a much 

 greater degree of cooperation than did the 

 commercial arrangements with the Canaries 

 and Singapore. The Soviet Ministry of 

 Fisheries, no less than the Ministries of 

 Defense and Foreign Affairs, recognized the 

 excellent possibility of establishing a base for 

 distant-water fishing fleets on that 

 strategically located island and, at the same 

 time, cementing political relations with Cuban 

 revolutionaries. The Soviet Union desired 

 Cuba as a fishing base as much as the Cuban 

 government desired the rapid development of 

 its marine fisheries. The Soviets promised to 

 build Cuba a modern fishing port, if the 

 Cubans would permit the USSR to use it as a 

 major base for its flsheries expansion in the 

 central and southern Atlantic. The agreement 

 on the construction of the Ashing harbor was 

 signed in Havana on 25 September 1962 by 

 the Soviet Minister of Fisheries, Alexander 

 Ishkov, and Cuban Prime Minister, Fidel 



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