3.1 



OVERVIEW 



The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) dissolved in December 1991, and most 

 of the 15 component republics established a looser political association in the Commonwealth 

 of Independent States (CIS). The Baltic States and Georgia chose not to join the CIS; as a 

 result, only two republics with high-seas fishing capabilities were included in the CIS -- the 

 Russian Federation and Ukraine. In October 1993, however, Georgia also asked to become a 

 CIS member. 



In the former Soviet Union, the fishery fleets of all republics operated as a unit divided 

 only by the various Soviet administrative fishery regions. Russian, Ukrainian, and Georgian 

 vessels all fished together in any particular fishing ground. Their fleets were under the 

 administrative command of the regional administration which organized these so-called 

 expeditions. A fleet of 30 to 40 large stern factory trawlers was managed by a fleet commander 

 whose headquarters were aboard a large baseship. It did not matter from what Soviet republic 

 the vessels originated, they were all part of this highly-organized fishing flotilla. The baseship 

 received the catch from the trawlers, processed it, and passed it on to refrigerated fish carriers 

 for transportation to homeport. The commander's flagship, supplied with fuel and other needs 

 by tankers and cargo transports, distributed these supplies among its vessels. This system, 

 which prevailed for the past 40 years, was suddenly disrupted by the new political arrangements. 

 Each independent country now had to organize its own support and transportation activities, and 

 obtain its own fuel (Georgia and Ukraine have no oil resources and must, therefore, buy diesel 

 oil from Russia or other countries). In addition, the bilateral agreements which were formerly 

 negotiated by the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries were no longer valid. The Russian Federation, 

 as the internationally recognized successor state to the Soviet Union, took over most of these 

 agreements. Ukraine and Georgia, thus, have to make their own arrangements to obtain access 

 to foreign 200-mile fishery zones. Georgia is especially disadvantaged because its diplomatic 

 corps and political leverage are limited. 



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