FISHERIES IN MICHIGAN WATERS OF GREEN BAY 



27 



a foretaste of this with the introduction of a bill 

 during the 1950-51 session of the Michigan State 

 Legislature to regulate commercial fishing in Delta 

 County (the greater part of the State of Michigan 

 waters of Green Bay lies within its boundaries). 

 Introduced for the stated purpose of protecting 

 the walleye and barely failing of passage, this 

 proposed legislation contained a series of restric- 

 tive provisions that would have crippled the in- 

 dustry sadly. Staff members of the Great Lakes 

 Fishery Investigations, when asked to offer an 

 opinion, opposed this legislation on the grounds 

 that it would deprive the community unnecessarily 

 of valuable production and impose severe hard- 

 ships on commercial operators. Opposition to this 

 measure was not against the principle of a rational 

 control over fishing intensity in a heavily exploited 

 area, but rather against the means proposed for 

 bringing about that control. 



Realistic consideration of the means whereby 

 we can best achieve the goal of a productive and 

 economically sound fishery in the Great Lakes is 

 badly needed. That a fishery, to be of maximum 

 benefit to the community, should be productive 

 would appear axiomatic. Mere abundance of fish, 

 no matter how high it may be, is of no value. It 

 is not the fish that are in the water but the fish 

 that are taken out of the water that provide food 

 and revenue. Yet this axiom often has been dis- 

 regarded. For the "protection" of fish, produc- 

 tive grounds have been closed, unsound size limits 

 established, species placed on the "game fish" list, 

 and other regulations imposed that serve prin- 

 cipally to limit production and create unused 

 stocks. 



It may be held axiomatic further that an eco- 

 nomically sound fishery not only must show a good 

 level of production with a high dollar value but 

 also must provide the average operator a reason- 

 ably good chance for adequate financial returns on 

 his investment and labor. To a large extent the 

 protective regulations in effect in the United States 

 waters of the Great Lakes — size limits that pro- 

 hibit the capture and sale of fish of a size at which 

 they are plentiful and in demand, closed seasons 

 that forbid operations at a time when fish are 

 easiest to take, closure of grounds to all com- 

 mercial fishing or the limitation of certain gears 

 to the less productive areas or depths, structural 

 specifications on gears that reduce their effec- 



tiveness . . . — limit the income of fishermen by 

 forcing on them inefficient methods of production. 

 The resulting increase in production costs 

 narrows the margin of profit on the one hand and 

 raises the price to the consumer on the other. 



It lies outside the scope of this paper to inquire 

 into the actual protective value of the many restric- 

 tions on fishing in the Great Lakes or into the 

 soundness of the speculation and theory on which 

 they are based. We are largely without facts to 

 form a judgment. Some may have averted dis- 

 aster in certain fisheries, others may have had no 

 significant effect either on the stocks or on the 

 conduct of fishing, and still others have, no doubt, 

 been detrimental. A few, such as certain closures 

 of productive areas for the alleged protection of 

 sport fisheries, are indefensible. Although the 

 extent and nature of protection needed and the 

 degree to which present regulations have provided 

 that protection may be debatable, these restric- 

 tions unquestionably have served to reduce fishing 

 pressure. The point at issue is the economic ex- 

 pediency of reducing fishing pressure by reducing 

 efficiency of operation. 



If the productive capacity of an area is limited, 

 it follows that regulation of fishing pressure may 

 be essential to the economic welfare of the fishery. 

 As the number of units of gear increases, the 

 share available for each unit becomes smaller, and 

 the catch per unit of effort declines — in short, fish- 

 ing becomes poor. The common remedy for such 

 a situation is to impose restrictions that lessen effi- 

 ciency of operation and aggravate economic dis- 

 tress by reducing further the catch per unit of 

 effort, and thus add to the cost of production. 

 Fishing pressure may be reduced as some operators 

 are forced out of business or transfer their ac- 

 tivities to other grounds, but the control comes 

 from economic hardship, not rational management. 



A sounder approach would appear to lie in lim- 

 iting the units of gear to a number that would 

 assure opportunity for profitable returns per unit 

 of fishing effort. Restricting the number of nets 

 per fisherman or per boat to accomplish this would 

 be of limited value, since with the number of fisher- 

 men remaining the same, the share available to 

 each would be unchanged. More effective would 

 be the gradual reduction in the number of licenses 

 (through the retirement of licenses not renewed) 

 until the point is reached at which a reasonably 



