be used of the rights of owners of 

 technology. These should include 

 the right to adeguate payment and 

 the right to protection against 

 unauthorized use. 



4) The price and value of technology, 

 as with any form of property, should 

 be determined by its usefulness in 

 the market and not by predetermined 

 concepts of cost or incremental 

 value to the supplier. 



5) Suppliers will normally accept 

 responsibility for the effective use 

 of technology only to the extent 

 they are able to participate 

 directly in the use of that 

 technology in the receiving 



e nv i r onme nt . 



6) The development of an international 

 and jointly respected vehicle for 

 arbitration of contract agreements 

 might be an important aspect of a 

 more stable and fruitful technology 

 transfer environment. 



The U.S. position at the Conference should 

 recognize the importance of these views. It 

 should also recognize that access on commercial 

 terms to proprietary technology available in the 

 U.S. private sector (through foreign subsidiaries 

 of U.S. firms, joint ventures, licensing, 

 consulting, or other means) is of critical 

 significance for industrialization in developing 

 countries. 



Concerns of the Developing Countries 



On the other side of the test of mutual interest 

 lies the desire of the developing countries — some of 

 them would call it their right — to have access to 

 industrial technology on more favorable terms than in 

 the past. Such access is seen as a necessary step 

 toward breaking what has been termed the "dependency 

 relationship" between the developing and the developed 

 nations. This dependence, developing countries assert, 

 results in an inability to make key decisions affecting 

 their own destinies because these destinies are so 

 overwhelmingly affected by decisions made in 

 industrialized nations. Developing nations see better 



48 



