with one another. The coupling processes must ac- 

 cordingly be organized "so as to achieve a fast and 

 effective flow of scientific and technological ideas 

 into industry and an equally fast and effective coun- 

 terflow of orders from industry to science." Only by 

 building better structural crosslinks can production 

 be made "to soak up new scientific ideas like a 

 sponge." 22 While the interactions between science 

 and industry have indeed become more direct and com- 

 plicated in recent years, organizational and motiva- 

 tional bonds have not yet been formed that are capa- 

 ble of breaking down the barriers separating these 

 two worlds. 



The strong military orientation of scientific R&D, 

 along with the secrecy that surrounds it, has con- 

 tributed to the underdevelopment of industrial tech- 

 nology. Much like the United States, the Soviet re- 

 gime has spent enormous sums on defense, aerospace, 

 and nuclear R&D while under investing in industrial 

 R&D. Nor has there been any substantial spin-off 

 from these national security and high technology re- 

 lated projects in terms of civilian applications to 

 national needs and improvements in the quality of 

 life. The resulting pattern has been a high con- 

 centration of talent and money in defense and space 

 and a seriously distorted deployment of S&T resources, 

 This pattern is not new to the Kremlin. A preoccupa- 

 tion with defense technology and the political-mili- 

 tary orientation of the state-directed effort are 

 deeply rooted in Russian history. From the time of 

 Peter the Great Tsarist governments were interested 

 in applying technology largely to military purposes. 



Still another thread of continuity in the Russian/ 

 Soviet complex of science and technology deserves 

 mention: the role of external influences in Russia's 

 development. Throughout its history, Russia's scien- 

 tific and technical ties with foreign countries, es- 

 pecially the Western world, have been limited and in- 

 termittent, if at times quite energetic. Internal 

 regime attitudes, Tsarist and Soviet, have fluctuat- 

 ed between two extremes. At times the government re- 

 sorted to artificial and imposed isolation. At other 



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