years, from among the "leading elements" of Soviet 

 society. As. a general estimate, about 35 percent of 

 the deputies are "outstanding" workers and peasants 

 by occupation, 35 percent are Party officials and 

 government administrators, and the remainder are var- 

 ious kinds of professionals, including scientists and 

 engineers . Though membership in the Communist Party 

 is not required for election, about three quarters of 

 the deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet in 1974 

 were Party members. The internal organization of the 

 Supreme Soviet and the relationship of the Soviet to 

 the Council of Ministers is illustrated in Figure 9-2, 



The Supreme Soviet generally meets in full session 

 no more than six to seven days a year. During these 

 sessions the deputies briefly discuss and approve 

 legislation formulated and presented by the Council 

 of Ministers and the Party Central Committee. Between 

 meetings, the authority of the Supreme Soviet is ex- 

 ercised by its Presidium. This body includes 39 mem- 

 bers: a chairman, a first deputy chairman, 15 deputy 

 chairmen (comprised of the chairmen of the supreme 

 Soviets of the 15 union republics), a secretary, and 

 21 ordinary members. Of the latter group elected to 

 the Presidium in 1974, 11, including Brezhnev and 5 

 other members of the Politburo and Secretariat, were 

 members or candidates of the CPSU Central Committee. 

 The composition of the membership again shows the in- 

 terlocking character of Party and government authori- 

 ties at the top of the political command structure. 

 The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, it may 

 be noted, is referred to as the president of the USSR, 

 In June 1977 Leonid Brezhnev assumed this post in ad- 

 dition to his position as General Secretary of the 

 Party. 



In general, the Supreme Soviet has great constitu- 

 tional authority but little effective political pow- 

 er. While the Soviet is officially the head of the 

 government, the sessions of the Soviet are too short 

 to permit meaningful deliberation of policy. Its pri- 

 mary concern is to legitimize and propagandize poli- 

 cies made elsewhere. 



26 



