analysts in Novosibirsk attribute the persistence of 

 these practices to the absence of formal criteria for 

 planning science and allocating resources. The 

 lack of any precise norms has allowed personal in- 

 fluence and establishment reputation to carry undue 

 weight. Dissatisfaction with existing methods causes 

 G. Pospelov, a Corresponding Member of the USSR Acad- 

 emy, to declare, "We must finance not only organiza- 

 tions, enterprises, and associations but also goals 

 and tasks, projects and programs. "29 The system of 

 institutional funding is also seen as a cause of in- 

 definite fixing of responsibility and poor coordina- 

 tion among R&D stages and projects. 



Still other Soviet writers point to the contra- 

 diction between the conservative structure of expen- 

 ditures based on financing of immobile scientific or- 

 ganizations and the inherently dynamic character of 

 science. 30 The inertia of existing institutions and 

 ongoing projects is hard to break. Indeed, it is al- 

 most impossible, it seems, to "shut off" any unsuc- 

 cessful program, much less "shut down" an unproduc- 

 tive institution. As A. M. Birman notes, "While pro- 

 viding ostensible regulation and supervision, the 

 present system of financing research allows some in- 

 stitutions to go for years without producing any sig- 

 nificant results. "31 At the same time, it is diffi- 

 cult to get new ideas and projects accepted. Mount- 

 ing concern over these defects of the existing system 

 led to rising emphasis in the 1970s on the need to 

 expand application of a "programmed-goals approach" 

 to planning and financing of R&D. Such an approach 

 oriented toward projects and end results is frequent- 

 ly used in the military and space sectors. Praising 

 this method, Pospelov notes, "The new will not have 

 to 'fight its way up' from below, proving its right 

 to exist. Under such a system of financing, all 

 shoots of the new will be visible from above and can 

 always be given timely assistance. "32 But program 

 planning and zero-based budgeting have not yet become 

 dominant forces in Soviet civilian R&D activities. 



To return to the issue of budgetary distribution, 

 industrial R&D conducted within the ministerial sys- 

 tem has a heavy component of state and ministry bud- 



97 



