decisions. The capability for such policy analysis 

 and integrated systems management exists only in ex- 

 ceptional instances where the nation has been galva- 

 nized towards a single goal or where a single nation- 

 al project has the general consent of the populace. 

 For the most part, decisions are made piecemeal. 

 Throughout the process there is considerable confu- 

 sion and disagreement, but the nation accepts these 

 inefficiencies and imbalances as the cost of diversi- 

 ty and of decision making that values open markets, 

 adversarial relations, and consensus building in pub- 

 lic policy. 



In the Soviet Union the planning of R&D is highly 

 structured in a top down manner. Most important S&T 

 goals are formally identified and selected. Current- 

 ly, this list consists of approximately 200 major 

 problems. The solutions to these problems are sched- 

 uled over periods of from one to three five-year in- 

 crements and are incorporated into the macroeconomic 

 plans for the USSR as a whole. Not only do plans 

 specify general objectives, but they also detail all 

 measures necessary for the attainment of goals, such 

 as requisite resources and their interrelationship, 

 experimental design, assignments for output and tech- 

 nology transfer, construction of new facilities. In 

 addition, the mechanisms for plan expression and en- 

 forcement, such as indicators, norms, standards, and 

 incentives, are similar at all levels and in princi- 

 ple are mutually reinforcing and internally consis- 

 tent. In the USSR, then, the whole structure of hi- 

 erarchical relationships is designed to integrate the 

 various activities of different units around central- 

 ly determined general goals. Thus, in principle at 

 least, the Soviet system offers great potential for 

 comprehensive planning, coherent analysis, and balanc- 

 ing assessments in S&T policies. 



In practice, however, Soviet R&D planning suffers 

 from serious deficiencies. Some of these result from 

 the inherent uncertainties and unpredictability of 

 innovation itself. Others are deeply rooted, however, 

 in Soviet organization and procedure. Though highly 



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