centralized, policy planning and analysis is heavily 

 compartmentalized not only in vertical branch minis- 

 tries but also in the numerous special functional 

 agencies. The innovation cycle is fractured in time, 

 task, and territory. The basis of planning, financ- 

 ing, and management is still primarily the functional- 

 institutional performer rather than programs, pro- 

 jects, and work stages. Furthermore, S&T planning is 

 also separate from and insufficiently coordinated 

 with the planning of production. 



Much as in the US, therefore, it is difficult for 

 central S&T policy makers in the USSR to exert inte- 

 grating influence upon a basically pluralistic admin- 

 istrative structure. The heavy chalk marks which de- 

 lineate different bureaucratic subsystems and insti- 

 tutional domains are not easily erased. To be sure, 

 there are more deliberate attempts than in the US at 

 overall priority-setting, program assessment, and co- 

 ordination. But the capabilities of the GKNT — the 

 main balancing wheel of the Soviet S&T mechanism — and 

 other functional agencies to analyze and evaluate al- 

 ternative program goals, costs, and benefits are con- 

 strained at every turn. They frequently lack the 

 authority and means to perform their integrating func- 

 tions. Given the nature of their overlapping and 

 shared responsibilities for R&D planning and manage- 

 ment, the state committees are often forced to seek 

 the approval of and accommodate themselves to various 

 ministries, departments, and other state committees, 

 not to mention Party agencies. As a result they per- 

 form a continuous and difficult balancing act in which 

 national goals and priorities are reconciled with the 

 special interests of the numerous organizations that 

 conduct the national R&D effort. 



The Soviet planning process, then, like the Ameri- 

 can budget process is salted with bureaucratic rival- 

 ries. Though calls are periodically heard to strength- 

 en the integrative capabilities of the GKNT, there is 

 still little inclination to give the State Committee 

 or any other body the clout necessary to forge coher- 

 ent, focused programs across ministerial and depart- 



314 



