funds have diminished the effectiveness of this pro- 

 gram. Yet there is potential in this and other pro- 

 grams to redirect the attention of scientists and 

 engineers to economic application, which is perhaps 

 the major theme of all current developments in Soviet 

 program management and control mechanisms regulating 

 the conduct of R&D. 



UTILIZATION OF R&D RESULTS 



The growing Soviet concern, reflected throughout 

 this study, for effective application of R&D results 

 in production and use is a consequence of two trends: 

 (1) the rising dependence of continuing Soviet eco- 

 nomic growth on technological innovation; and (2) re- 

 latively poor Soviet performance in translating sci- 

 entific ideas into new products and processes. The 

 first necessitates improved performance in the entire 

 R&D sector. The second focuses on the greatest prob- 

 lem within that sector. As General Secretary Brezh- 

 nev phrased the issue in 1971, "If one examines all 

 the links of the complex chain uniting science with 

 production, it is not too difficult to see that the 

 links connected with the practical realization of 

 scientific achievements and their adoption in mass 

 production are the weakest. "31 



The overriding reason for this deficiency is the 

 absence, under traditional Soviet operating practices, 

 of individuals and organizations that are both capa- 

 ble of and interested in effecting the transition to 

 application. In principle, the independent research, 

 design, and development organizations are obligated 

 to supply the production establishment with technical 

 documentation, working blueprints, and/or prototypes 

 of new products and processes ostensibly ready for 

 utilization. But the effective judge of the "readi- 

 ness" of an innovation is the designer or developer 

 himself, and he has little incentive to undertake 

 gratuitously activities which will only help the pro- 

 ducer. The latter, in turn, receives little or no 



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