solving and the tactics of implementation which rec- 

 ognize the need for a cautious, experimental, and in- 

 cremental mode of reform. 



At the same time, it is inaccurate to attribute 

 the slow pace of science policy reform simply or sole- 

 ly to bureaucratic resistance and political conser- 

 vatism, The responses of Soviet leaders to the man- 

 ifold problems at hand appear to be based on a more 

 complex calculus of decision. Not only do they rec- 

 ognize some of the fundamental — and not just politi- 

 cal — constraints at work in the Soviet system. They 

 also are more aware of the complexities of modern 

 science, technology, and development. To be sure, 

 some still cling to the hope of simplistic solutions. 

 But solutions to complex problems are themselves usu- 

 ally complex. While this is not always understood, 

 some Soviet specialists and political leaders are 

 fully aware of the difficulties of effecting organi- 

 zational and behavioral change. Milner himself ar- 

 ticulates well the basic dilemma that confronts So- 

 viet policy makers in science and technology as the 

 USSR moves into the 1980s. There is no doubt, he 

 says, that modern systems approaches and more sophis- 

 ticated techniques make R&D planning and management 

 more difficult. They bring it "into a new class, in- 

 to a new situation." "But it is not possible by any 

 other way," he emphasizes, "to solve the new and com- 

 plex problems of development of the national economy, 

 which have no precedent in our past experience." 8 ^ 

 Perhaps the greatest stride in contemporary Soviet 

 S&T policy has been the discovery that there are no 

 simple or final answers to the problems of advancing 

 technology and change. 



288 



