for more than a third of all expenditures, while the 

 top 100 companies spend about two-thirds of the total. 



During the past decade, moreover, both superpowers 

 have been forced to adjust their S&T policies to meet 

 broader national goals and new requirements. Many of 

 the same concerns that have motivated policy makers 

 and animated debate in Washington have also been keen- 

 ly felt in Moscow. Primary preoccupation with ques- 

 tions of national security, which underlay the science 

 policy efforts of both countries in the 1950s and the 

 1960s, has given way, more or less, to greater con- 

 cern with applying science and technology to solve 

 domestic civil sector problems. "Research applied to 

 national needs" has become a new buzzword in American 

 and Soviet official circles alike. The development 

 of natural recources, energy, and the environment have 

 emerged as major issues on the S&T agendas to an ex- 

 tent unanticipated in either country just a few years 

 ago. Low economic growth and lagging productivity in 

 both the US and USSR have stimulated increasing in- 

 terest in formulating science policies oriented to 

 industrial innovation. Indeed, the use of R&D, which 

 both governments practically ignored in science pol- 

 icy in the past, is finally coming into focus in the 

 US federal government and is assuming almost exagger- 

 ated emphasis in the Soviet Union. 



In face of these changing conditions and new de- 

 mands the adequacy of traditional policies and mech- 

 anisms is being increasingly questioned. In the US 

 a new partnership in S&T is being called for between 

 public and private R&D performers. Similarly, the 

 Soviet regime has been pressing for a closer relation- 

 ship between research and industry to achieve a more 

 coordinated effort in the national interest. Both 

 countries share a concern with the health of science 

 and technology and debate how to improve capacity and 

 performance. 



In spite of some patterns in common, however, the 

 science policy environments in the US and USSR are 

 fundamentally different. Even apparent structural 

 equivalents may mask basic differences in underlying 



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